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Pompey the Great is one of the major enigmas of history. He rose 
speotaoularly to a position of power~ and glory in the Roman state; he as spec 
tacularly fell from that eminence into defeat and dishonor. He was suocess-
ively almost reverently loved and oordially detested -- more, he inspired 
love and dislike at one and the SaBle time in the very same people. Yet, 
despite the enmities he bad made and the ijnominy ot his deoline, he enjoyed 
a high reputation for many yeers after his death; an aura of glory long hung 
around his name. Seneca, sharp as he was at times in his oensure of Pompey, 
yet saw fit to call him ftdeous istud firmamentumque impariiftJl to Velleius 
Paterculus he was ftprinceps Romani nominisPJ~ and Lucan, in the supposed words 
of Cato, who bore Pompey no love, proclaims him ·alarum et venerabile nomen 
gentibus. a3 On the other hand, in modern times his oblivion is all but com-
plete; historians exhibit an almost universal uniformity in their treatment 0 
Pompey's place in the scheme of things. He is a secondary character, he is 
mentioned more or less in paSSing, as his career high-lights or falls toul of \ 
1 Seneca, DiAlogi vi.~O. 
~ Vel1eiua Pateroulus ii.S3. 
1 
h 
~ those of other apparently more worth;y heroes; he is merely the foil to the 
greatness of such men as Caesar end Cicero. Loaded shelves of every library 
testify to the importance which scholars accord to the names of Cicero and 
Caesar, the most painstaking research will unearth but a handful of works on 
the career of Pompey. In spite of the pre-eminence to which he at one time 
attained, in the Judgment of histo~ he bas, to use a modern colloquialism, 
"missed the boat.-
There may be a number of reasons whY Pompey has fallen into the 
historical dust-bin. mslife was involved in and immediately followed by 
events so spectacular and of such lasting and far-reaching effects, that it 
is not surprising that he is overwhelmed and his glory dimmed by the luster 
of his more successful antagonist, Caesar. Another factor that may explain 
Pompey·s fall into oblivion is the fact that, save for a few trifling excep-
tions,4 he has left no extant writings. Caesar took great care to vindicate 
his position and perpetuate.his name in pertinent written documentsl all that 
is known of Pompey - his character, his acts, his aims and ambitions - is 
gathered from the writings of others, some friendly, some hostile. He has lef 
no apologia, nothing to vindicate his career, nothing to keep his memory fres • 
Such an omission may seem of minor consequence in esta,blishing the historical 
position of a personality, yet it is to be noted, especially in modern times, 
that the accomplishments of the so-called great are fre~uently accompanied by 
a desire &ld an effort to, as the saying goes, -tell the worla about it." How 
_ 4 There are some half-dozen letters, one recorded in Sallust's 
Historia!, the others preserved among the correspondence of Cicero. 
3 
wall this was~practiced by Cicero and how greatly it has enhanced his reputa-
tion is too well known to need any furth~r elaboration. 
Whatever may be the extrinsic reasons, however, for the diminution 
of Pompey's historical stature, the character, the personality, the captil.bil-
ities of tht:: man himself must be a deoiding factor in any judgment of his 
importance in his own times and of hls claim to the remembrance of posterity. 
It is this human element that is to be the subjeot of the present thesis. 
~hat was Pompey the Man -- what were his abilities and his defioienoies, his 
personality, his oharacter? It would seem that the answers to these questions 
should be easily ascertainable; there exists, and has existed for oentuz'ies, 
a mass of written evidence that, properly correlated and analyzed, should 
readily furnish a clear picture of the man Pompey. Yet, in spite of this 
wealth of evidence, in spite of years of learned investigation and discussion, 
there is still, after twenty centuries, the widest disagreement among scholar 
as to the real nature of Po~~ey's character, personality and capabilities • 
.i.Sven as to his ability as a military leader - generally acknowledged to be 
his greatest claim to farne - there is no unanimity. Some will have it that 
his mili tB.ry reputation rested on victories won against far inferior oppo-
nenta;5 others that in talent he was superior even to his conqueror, Caesar;6 
5 FranK Burr Marsh, 11 HistorY 91. thsr Romsn World from ill. ~ .2Q. 
London, (1935], ~O. 
6 lienry G. Liddell, !. History: 91. home, London, 1855, II, 456. 
4 
ft 
a number pruise his capacity for ol'h,;/;:l.Iliz,e. tiOll; 7 ElioL1JUS(;m8 calls him timiu. In 
rq;e.rtl to other facets of his life, there is still gret:~ter disagreement. His 
Ilwnole care.;;!' ••• was \~clent and. illicitll;9 he was <;1 ndl.3ep disoembler, ,,10 
~ "solemn wavererR;ll yet, he was "honest ana well-meaning,1l1~ and in the 
Ifsh4i.r-p thrust ana parry of perty politics, ••• helple:ss as cl child-;1.3 he 
was "neither a profligate nor an uns~rupulous &dventurer,-14 but he w~s Duct 
, 
slow to appropriate what belonged to othersJ!;15 "his affable manners and 
generosity in giving won him general favour,ft16 but ahe was destitute of the 
real ieneroaity wluch makes and retains friends ft17 and "without tact, taste, 
7 Charles Oman, Seven Roman Sj;.atesmen 9I.. ,).b§. Later l"epublic, New 
York, (1934), ;(.36. Cyril £. Robinson, ! History of the Roman Republic, New 
YorK, (193~], 317. 
d Theoaor ::ilommsen, .!hi. HistorY g! Rome, trans. William .Purdie Dick 
son, new ed., New York, 1905, IV, ;:.7'1:.. 
9 Ronald Syme, The #Oman rteygluj;.ion, Oxford, 1939, 316. 
10 Charles &erivale, The 1all .2.i the Ranum Republig, new ed., Lon-
don, 1895, 160. 
II W. E. Heitland, The Roman .itepublic, Cambridge, ule.land, 1909, 
HI, 3b8. 
1'1:. J. L. Strachan-Davidson, Cicero and the 1J!.!l of th~ Roman !tepy 
lli., New Yo.rk, [lg94], .. ;0. 
13 Robinson, History, 317. 
14 Oman, Seven Statesmen, .36. 
15 Liddell, Hiptory, II, 456. 
16 Ibid. 




or ai'fabili ty~ .. 18 lnstanoes of this kind might be multiplied, but those given 
should be sufficient to confirm the truth ot the initial statement of this 
thesis. 
It, then, after so many centuries, so many eminent scholars have 
not been able to come to any agreement in their analysis ot Pompey the man, 
what exactly is the end and scope o~ the investigation proposed herein? The 
present writer does not presume, in a work of this kind, to be able to say 
the last word on the subject. In the analysis ot human character and person-
ality, it is doubtful whether the last word ever can be said. In the case ot 
Pompey there is the added diffioulty that all the available data, but for 
the trivial exceptions previously noted, are, as it were, second-hand. The 
record of his actions and the estimate of his character must be sought for 
in the writings of others than himself, all ot whom have their own personal 
feelings, ideas, prejudices and ambitions. No more is aimed at in this thesis 
therefore, than to gather together in one place and to correl&te and analyze 
the various opinions of Pompey's activities found in the writings ot his con-
temporaries and near-contemporaries, who were in a position in time and place 
to ascertain t~cts and torm reasonable judgments. The writers whose works 
will furnish the material for the investigation are principally, though not 
exclusively, Romans (that is, of the city of Rome) and, if not contemporary 
with Pompey, principally of the first oentury A. D. 
Caesar , 
Of these ancient authors, Cicero is by t&.r the most' import&nt, both 
18 W. W. How and h. D. Leigh, A History of ~ ~ 1h§. Leath of 




by l'eason of .the vast quantity of pertinent written evidence that he has left 
alld the relationship he bore to Pompey. 'l'he two men were almost exact con-
temporaries & theJ' were born the same year and died but five years apartJ the 
public life of each was closely involved with that of the other; and there 
was, in some degree and with some Qualification, a bond of friendship between 
them. An association so close, both~in public and in private life, could not 
ia.il to give Cicero the opportunity for a clear insight into the character of 
Pompey_ When that opportunity is coupled with prolific literary activity, the 
result is a vast wealth of information and opinion on the subject of the 
great Pompey. The information may at times be garbled and the opinion colored 
by personal considerations of the author, but the writings of Cicero have to 
be admitted as the chief source of any study of the life of Pompey. In a 
goodly number of his writings Cicero has found occasion to speak of Pompey; 
it is in the correspondence, however, that his pen flows most freely on the 
subject and, it is to be believed, most honestJ..y and impartially. The Letters 
of Cicero, therefore, are to form the nucleus about which the discussion of 
Pompey in this thesis is to be built. In fact, they will be the only part, 
with but ~ rare e.ll.ception or two, of Cicero's works that will enter into the 
inv~stigation. Only one reason for this need be cited: the orations comprise 
the other large body of writing, apart from the letters, that has reference 
to Pompei, and b.y their very nature political speeches are ill-suited to the 
expression of unbiased, objective truth. Such a speech, for instance, as the 
fro Lege Manilia is no more likely to present a true portrait of Pompey than 
it is to express ~icero's real sentiments; it is a political speech end, as 
SUCh, is to be viewed with suspicion. 
7 
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'rha .letters, however, are of a quite different n.sture. They huve 
been universally acclaimed as one of the most import~dlt literary monuments 
bequeathed by the sncients to posterity. They have been called "the very 
marrow of Roman cultural history,,;19 in them ·one of the most interesting 
epochs in the annals of the world is unfolded to us in a series of cabinet 
pictures by a master hand."'-:O And these pictures present their subjects "in 
the aspect which they presented to their friends and associates, not in the 
aspect which they presented to the 'florId and to the historian. na 'I'herein 
lies the value of the letters. They are free from the taint that attaches to 
the speeches, in that they 'fIere not, for the most part, written for publica-
tion and are, therefore, as honest and impartial as a man of Cicero's pecul-
i&1'ly sensitive temperament could make them. There are exceptions, of courseJ 
some of the letters were no doubt written with the realization that they 
would b~ handed about and these, therefore, could oloak ulterior motives. But 
the w.ajority were private letters and, as such, were of a strictly confi-
dential nature. how oonfidential Cicero himself intended them to be is shown 
by the caution he exercised in their dispatch; in a number of instances he 
remarks on the difficulty of finding trustwortrv carriers and on the neces-
sity of cloaKing his thoughts in a kind of code of vague generalities, lest 
the documents miscarry. The trustworthiness of the letters is further con-
19 Tenney Frank, PCicero," Proceedings SJI. the British Academy, 
~, London, [1933], 115 • 
.4U itobert Yelverton Tyrrell and Louis Claude Purser, !h§. Corre-
spondence SJI.!!!. Tullius Cicero, Dublin, 1879-1901, I, luvi. 
~1 Ibid., lxxvii. 
8 
'lit 
firmed by the. nature of the man to whom the greater part of the corraspondenc 
Wb.S addressed, Cicero's bosom friend, Atticus. Atticus, had he chosen, could 
probably r$ve been one of the most astute politicians of his age. He was a 
m!:>n who knew how to keep his counsel, calm, level-heeded, and so t!,dept lit 
maintaining his balance between opposing forces that in the final struggle 
between Pompey and Caesar he wes ab~e to remain on the best of terms with bot 
of them. 44 It was in such a man that 
Cicero found the friend exactly fitted to supplement rJia own qU!:lities. 
The warm impulsive heart of the one sought repose in the easy-tempered, 
stable, appreciative nature of the other. l'he impetuous, indiscreet man 
of genius needed a calm, sympathising and absolutely safe companion, in 
whose ear he could breathe all his fears and hopes and doubt~; through 
all the years of their intercourse never a word escaped through Atticus 
which could add to Oicero' s embal·rassments. It is from this perfect con-
fidence that the letters to Atticus derive their peculiar interest and 
their peculiar value. Oicero is no more likely to deceive Atticus than a 
patient is liKely to lie to his physici~inJ the statement of the circum-
stances which he lays bef'ore his counsellor may someti.mes be erroneous, 
but it is never wilfully misleading.~3 
Moreover, the internal evidence of the letters themselves proves their confi-
dentinl na.ture and thus indicates their pI'0bable sincerity. To a man of 
Cicero's temperament, eager for present fame and the plaudits of posterity, i 
is unthinkable tr.l8.t he would bc.ve expressed himself in the fashion he did, ha 
he thought that his correspondence would be viewed by 8Jly other thlm the des-
tined reCipient. ~ot long before hia death, when the question arose of the 
collection ana publication of his letters, he insists on the necessity of 
~~ Nepos xxv.? 
,3 Strachan-Davidson, Cicero and ~ 69. 
9 
.". 
rereading and-correcting them.'4 There is no doubt that, if he had had the 
oppor-tuni ty of editing them, there is h ~ree.t deal tr..t;.t he would have excised 
0:;:' rewritten. That he did not do tJO is obvious. In too many of the letters he 
rev6£tls him~elf in a too unfl~.ttering light to have allowed thalli to be ll."lhde 
publiC as they were. It is reusonable to suppose, therefore, that in his cor-
res~ondence Cicero was at Ius sincerest and t~t the opinions he put to paper 
though perr£ps erroneous and certsinly fickle, were the true expreseions of 
his sentiments of the moment. 
The order of the thesis, then, will be, first, to arle.lyse and 001'-
relate the judgments of Pompey expressed in the letters of Cicero. These judg 
menta m~ be viewed from several different angles, as they illuminate various 
f~cets of Pompey's life and oareer; he can be studied as a soldi~r, as ti 
statesman, and as ~ man in his everyday relations with his friends and conte 
poraries. 'I'he expI'6ssed opinions of Cicero will, therefore, be grouped under 
these three aspects, and an attempt will be m~de to determine, if possible, 
IUS sincere and considered judgment of Pompey as ~ soldier, a statesman and a 
man. The second part of the thesis will present in the same order the opinion 
and judgments, whether corroborative or contradictory of Cicero, of other 
ancient writers who were oontemporary or nearly contemporary with Pompey. And 
finally, the concluding chapter will sum up briefly the a~lient points of 
Pompey's personality that have been developed. Here, too, at last, Pompey wil 
. 
be allowed to speak for himself: the meager evidence of r~s own few letters 
~ Cicero, Epistulue .w! Atticum xvi.5. 
10 
'lit 
tha.t have been preserved will be prest.;ll).ted to shed what light it may on the 




POMP£Y, THL TiSTIMONY OF CIC~ 
The extant oorrespondence of' Cicero comprises some nine hundred 
letters, which have been traditionally ,rouped and published under tour 
titles, Ad. Atticum • .M F'amiliares, !4 SCuintum Fratre.m and Ad Brutum. The bulk 
of the oorrespondence talls into the first two categories -- although those 
titles are slightly misleading, inasmuch as the letters "to Attious· and -to 
his friends" include a number of' letters !2. Cicero tram his various carre-
spondents, and even some few that are neither by Cicero nor addressed to him. 
However, by far the greater part of' the correspondence -- well over eight 
hundred letters -- is the work ot Cicero himself, and it is these that will 
furnish the material for the present chapter; whAtever is pertinent to Pompey 
in the other letters of the collection will be discussed in subsequent chap-
ters as being the testimony of other ancient writers. The traditional grouping 
of Cicero's correspondence is open to further criticism in that it almost 
completely ignores the chronological sequence of the letters. The letters ~ 
Familiares are for the most part divided into books and classified by corre-
spondents -- as are the other letters, as indicated by their titles. Such an 
arrangement is natural enough, and it was undoubtedly a practical considere-
. 
tion with the collector and euitor, since the letters were in the hands of the 
11 
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'v~rious recipi~nts,~ but it is an inconvenient arrangement for any orderly 
study of the development of the events end personalities of the times. This 
p.coblew. of chronology has bean talten up by a number of scholars, and there 
hav.;: been a number of mOdel"'l1 edi tiona of the letters, either in whole or in 
~art, arrunged in chronologic~ order. Of these, the monumental work of 
Tyl~rt::ll and Purser is outstanding, elld it will be taken as the principal 
sour~(;;, both in its text &nd in its chronology, for the study of the letters 
of Cicero in this thesis. No disparagement of the work of other editors is 
hert' su;.;gested, but a single text h8.s been deemed most satisfactory for the 
discussion in lwnd. The present writer has, indeed, consulted and compared 
other editions of the letters, but an exhaustive textual criticism would be 
far from the purpose of this thesis. In fact, in very few instances do the 
discrepancies of text and chronology among the various saitors h&ve any bear-
lug on th~ portrayal of Pompey·s personality; any such discrepancies that are 
pertinent will be noted as they oocur. 
According to the chronology of Tyrrell and Purser, therefore, the 
correspondence of Cicero begins in the year 6d B. C. and continues until the 
year of his death, 43 B. C. However, the letters do not form a single solid 
procession through these twenty-six years. Their number varies frOID year to 
year, and there are many gaps. Thus, from the year 68 up to and including the 
ye&r 65, there are only eleven letters; for the years 64 and 63 there are 
1 It was apparently not a general practice with Cicero to keep 
copies of his letters. Not long before his death, when there was queetion of 
the publication of ids correspondence, he wrote that there was no collection 
of r~s letters at the time, but that his secretary Tiro bad about seventy of 
them (M Att. xvi.5). 
13 
"" none.. in the yeaf' 6" they recommence (with a letter to Pompey, curiously 
enough) and continue more or less steadily until the end. The prolixity of 
the correspondence: in some years and its meagerness or complete 8.bsence in 
others make i~ almost obvious thet a great many of Cicero's letters must have 
failed of survival. The year 64, in which Cicero canvassed for the consulship, 
should have been productive of a huge quantity of correspondence, and it is 
hal"dly conceivable thcd his consulship, in the year 63, should not also have 
been an oecea.sion for' &. vMt amount of letter-writing; yet, for both these 
yearp he is strangely silent. 
Be thi~ as it muy, for all practical purposes the correspondence of 
Ci;;ero begins in earnest in the year 6", at the very time whoo. Pompey was 
returning from his campai6ns in the .wst to be a permanent and ever-present 
figure on the Roman political scene for the next fourteen years. Thus, the 
principal portion of Cicero's correspondence is coterminous with tl~t period 
in which Pompey, after returning to Rome a conquering hero and a popular idol, 
plummeted to the depths of discredit, dishonor and defeat. One would like to 
know how largely Pompey figured in the lost letters of the earlier period, 
but, at any rate, in the few that haTe survived of that period he is mentioned 
but once, in a letter of the year 65, not long before Cicero was to begin his 
active canvass for the consulships 
-
Illam manum tu mihi cura ut praestes, quoniam propius abes, Pompeii 
nostri amici. Naga me ei iratum fore, si ad mea comitia ~on venerit. 2 
You must undertake to secure for me the 'entourage' of our friend Pompey, 
since you are nearer than I. Tell him r shall not be annoyed if he 
2 Cicero, AS. Att. i.l. 
14 
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doesn't come to my election. 
The passage is indicative of little as regards Cieero's opinion of or feeling 
tOW8.l'ds Pompey: a poli tici,:m looKing forward to an important election makes a 
profession of fritmCtship and a gesture of kindly forbearance. But there is no 
other indication at this time, at least as far e.s the letters e.re concerned, 
of the nature of Cicero's relations with Pompey. 
however, in the correspondence that recommences in 6~, Pompey bet;ins 
to loom large, and it is at this }Joint tm:.t the three aspects under which he 
is to be studied will be taken up. The first consideration is that of Pompey 
as a soldier and military leader. J.nd here must be noted what was asserted in 
the first chapter of tIllS theflis,~a that the orations of Cicero are not 8, 
satisfactory ba.sis for determi.nin~ hie true opinion of Pompey. In the Pro Le e 
Manilla, for in8t~nce, Cicero is lavish to the point of extravagance in the 
praise of a11llost ever'.! pttase of Pompey's militur'.f exploits, such enthusia.sm is 
not apparent in the letterss·there is praise of Pompey, to be sure" but it is 
moderate and reserved. However, let the correspondence speak for itself. The 
first pt';l'tinent letter is one of the year 6~, addressed to Pompey in Asia as 
he: is about to return home after the successful conclusion of. the Aii thridE.tic 
war; inusmuch as Cicero reveals himself in it as eager for the support and 
friendShip of Pompey, its Sincerity is suspect. The genere.l is praised for his 
sUCcessful campE:.ign* "tantam enim spem otii ostendisti, quantwu ego semper 
omnibus te uno fretus poliicebartt3 - "you have given us that 'strong hope of 
26. See above 6. 
I 3 Cicero, Epistula, ~ '§wj1ares v.7. L~L--------------------------~ 
15 
peace, of whic~~ in sale reliance on you, I was ~ssuring every oneD; 
flattered with the assurance tlmt Cicero is eager to be associated with "mul 
maiori quam Africanus fuit"4 - lie man far greater thtm Africunus." After thi 
letter, there is a lapse of more than a dozen years before, Cicero speaks egai 
at any length on the subject of Pompey's generalship; once during this period 
he mc:..kes a passing reference to his ttpraestf'ntissimis • • • rebus gM3tis'" 
"most brilliant militar-j achievements.· Such a silence on Cicero's part illl 
understtmdable in view of his temperament and inte,rests; he was fJ. politician 
and a statesman, not a military man, and would l:w.ve only secondary thoughts 
for mili uU"Y e.ffairs lmtil they wer~ forced upon him by circumstances. Hence, 
it was not until Caesar stood on the Rubicon that Cicero had much to s"y in 
hie letters of Pompey as a military man. Early in Je.nuary, 49, he writes to 
his freedrru:"'iU and secretary, TirOl 
Numquam msiore in periculo civitas fuit; numquam imprebi cives harJUcrunt 
paratiorem ducem. Omnino ex hac quoque parte diligentissime comparatur. 
Id fit auctoritate et studio Pompeii nostri, qui Caesarem sere coepit 
timere. 6 
Never was the state in greater danger; never have disloyal citizens had a 
bettt31:' prepared :can at their hE:ad. On the whole, very c8,reful prep~~ra­
tiona are being made on our side also. This is due to the influence and 
activity of our old fr'iend Pompey, who, now that it is too late, is 
beginning to be afraid of Caesar. 
Although there is a criticism here of Pompey's short-Sightedness, there is 
also a somewhat unenthusiastic expression of confidence that the situation is 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid., i.9. 
6 ~., xvi.ll. 
16 
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under control fJld in good hands; a few days later, in a letter to Atticus, 
Cicero is less sanguine. 
Gnaeus noster quid oonsilii oeperit capiatve ne80io, adhue in oppidis 
coartatus at stupens •••• Adhuc certe, nisi ego 1nsanio, stults omnia 
et incaute.7 
~hat plan our Gnaeus has adopted or is adoptini, I don't know. as yet, 
he is cooped up in the towns and in a su,te of lethargy. • • • Up to now, 
unless 1 am out of my senses, hts proceedings are all fatuous and rash. 
~ , 
A Yleek later, another letter' to Attiaus remarks I "dux quam 0( ~T fo( -r i r ~ TOS 
tu quoque animadvertis,,8 - ·you, too, notice how ungeneral-like our leader 
isPJ and Cicero's exasperation seems to reach its peak early in the fol1o~ing 
month' 
Gnaeus autem noster - 0 rem miseram at incredibileml - ut totus iacetl 
non animus est, non consilium, non copiae, non diligentia. Mittam illa, 
fuga."I/ ab urbe turpissimam, timidissimas in oppidis contiones, ignoratio-
nem non solum adversarii, sed stiam suarum copiarum.9 
What an inconceivable plight is Pompey's, and how utterly he has broken 
down! He has neither spirit nor plan, nor forces, nor energy. I say 
notlnng of his most disgraceful flight from the City, his timorous 
sp8eches in the tONnS, his ignorance not only of the strength of his 
opponent, but even of tUB own forces. 
This indictment of almost evert phase of Pompey's generaJ.ship is a far cry 
from the lavish praises of the Pro ~ Map:! tia. Had Cicero I s considered 
opinion so drastically changed in seventeen years or had Pompey's grasp of 
mil! tary affairs so noticeably weakened? Or was it Cicero's own panicky fear 
that clouded his judgment? Certa.inly, later writers have not been so forth-
7 Cicero, AS. Att. vii.10. 
g Ibid., 13a. 
9 Ibid.,.a. 
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right in oonde~ing Pompey's maneuver's in Italy at the outbreclt of the civil 
wa.c • .At an;y rate, such was Cicero's expressed opinion of the moment. This tone 
of dissatisfaction, however, finds no way into a letter of the following week 
addressed to the general himself. Pompey was in Luceria, where he had estab-
lished tds headquarters after withdrawing from Rome; Cicero, in command at 
Formiae, writes him a fairly lengthy report of activities in the district. The 
tone of the letter is respectful, almost subservient, he asks advice, otfers 
suggestions; he a.ssures Pompey thlat "auctoritate at consilio tuo in spe fir-
miore BUlllus"lO - "your influence and your policy have encouraged me. II Only 
one note of mild complaint creeps into the letter, a note that retlects 
Cicero's previous displeasure a.t Pompey's apparent lack of organization and 
planning' "nunc quod tuum conailium aut quae ratio belli sit ignoro"ll -- -at 
the p.r:escnt moment I do not know what are your ideas and plan of campaign. It 
Oicero we.s either a splendid liar or his spi!'i t was even more neilis. ting than 
usual at tide time, :i'or two days later he \vrites to Atticus. 
Mill! enim nihil u.Ua in gente mr.quaLl ab ullo auctore rei publicae ac duce 
turpiu.s .factwn esse videtur quam a nostro amico factum est • • • ; urbem 
rellquit, id est, patriEJD., 1)1'0 qua et in qua mori praeclarum tuit.12 
It seems to rue that never in any. land has any statesman or general acted 
as disgracefully as !~S our friend ••• J he lett the city -- his 
tathtlrland, that is - for which and in which it WElre glorious to die. 
Apparently, Pompey's unf'orgivable sin in Cicero's eyes was the abandonment 01." 
!lome, Y8t it is by no means cer~!n that the move was not necessary and strt~-





tegically sound. In the S~:U:ile letter there is a stu.tement that ma.y go far in 
e;:;(pJ.aining Pompey's fina.l coUapae and defe8t: "in unius hominis quotannis 
periculose aegrotantis anima. posi taa omes n.ostr&s spes haberuusQ13 -- "our 
sole hope lies in the life of one roan, who falls dan~erously sick every yea::." 
Til,,;; yel;.r before, at Naples, Pompey had been stricken with an illness that had 
br'O"t.i.ght him to the brink of death; this letter seems to indicate that toot 
illness was but a more than usually violeut attack of some recurrent disease, 
probably contracted in the East, that pla.gued the later years of his life. 
Several later writers14 see in the seizure at Naples the turning point in 
Pompey's career and lament the fact that death had not then taken him in his 
prosperity and forestalled his plunge into defeat and ignominy. lar be it from 
the writer of this thesis to rest his case on a "post hoc, ergo propter hoe" 
argument, but consideration must be given to the possibility that Pompey's 
apparent ineptitude in the last two years of his life was the result ot his 
physical oondition. 
The next letter to Atticus continues in the same strains 
Nihil actum est a Pompeio nostro sapienter, nihil fortiter: addo etiem, 
nihil nisi contra consilium auctori tatemque meam. • • • Quid foedius, 
Quid perturbatiu8 hoc ab urbe discessu sive potius turpissima nequissima 
fuga?15 
Pompey has not made one prudent or courageous move -- nor one that is not 
contrary to my counsel and advice. • • • What can be more disgusting, 
more significant of panic, than this withdrawal, or rather this disgrace-
13 Ibid. 
14 VeUsius Paterculus ii.43; Seneca, 12iMogi vi.;(O; Juvenal x.283-
19 
1It 
ful and ini.quitous fli~ht, from the city? 
TllG mo.;;t noteworthy feature of this pessage is Cicero's betrayal of himself in 
his resentment at the rejection of his Qounsel, it raises the question 01: how 
much of his censure of Pompey is due to his own wounded vanity and how much to 
an hont:)st appraise.l of the facts. Be this as it may, Cicero soon finds another 
SOu.r-':0 of annoyance. Pompey was in too process of removing his troops to Brun-
disium, prevaratory to abandoning Italy, and there was some doubt "hether he 
would go to the assistance of one of his commanders, Domitius, besieged ~J 
Ceeser in Corfinium. Oicero writes to Atticusc 
Unurc etiam restat arnico nostro ad omue dedecus, ut Domitio non aubveniat. 
• • • Nisi me omnia fallunt, deaeret. Incredibili tel' pertimui t. Nihil 
spectat nisi fugam, ••• ante fugit qU~ll seit aut quem fugiat aut quo, 
• • • nostra tradidi t, • • • patriam rellqui t, Italiam relinqui t.16 
But one thing remains to our friend to crown his disgrace, not to go to 
the assistance of Dam tius. • • • Unless I am greE.tly mistaken, he will 
desert him. He is unbelievably alarmed. He thinks of nothing but night; 
• •• flees before he knows whom he is fleeing or wr~ther, • • • has 
betrayed us, ••• has abandoned his country - and is leaving Italy. 
And a day or two later, after Pompey had failed to relieve Domitius and Oorfi-
nium had fallen to Caesar. 
...... 
Quamvis amemus Gnaeum nostrum ••• , taman hoc, quod tali bus nris non 
subvenit, laudere non possum. Nam sive timuit, quid ignaTius? sive, ut 
quids..>n putant, meliorem SUrutl. causam illorum oaede fore putaTit, quid 
iniustius?17 
Though 1 love Pompey • • • , still I cannot praise his failure to succour 
suoh men. If it was fear, it was most cowardly; if, as some think, he 
imagined that their massacre would afH'3ist his cause, it was mozt ini<1ui-
tous. 
16 Ibid., 7. 




50 J a.s Cicero h!lld feared snd exptwted, Pompey did not go to the relief of Cor-
finium and Domitius was obli~ed to capitulate. That Domitius may have been 
stubborn and foolhardy and placed himself' in an inextricable positionl8 or 
that there TMJ:y have been a Variety of reasons for Pompey's abandonment of Cor-
finium seems not to have entered Cicero's head; he is obsessed with the idea 
tt~t Pompey's only motivation is fe8r~and his only object flight. Thus, the 
two passages just cited are exoeptionally striking illustrations of the low 
esteem in which Cicero held Pompey at this time; be is even inclined to lend 
credence to the tale that Pompey was willing to sacrifice military advantage 
in order to revenge himself on his personal enemies. 
~eanwhile, Pompey hs.d arrived at Brundisium, and Cicero writes him 
there a very long letter, which is fOI' the most part a defense of his own 
policy and activities and a profession of friendship and loyalty. Still, there 
is a tone of dissatisfaction and resentment; he expresses bis disappointment 
at the outcome of the ai.'falr at Cor.f'iniuma "in eadem opinione fui qua reliqui 
omnes, te cum omnibus copiis ad Corfinium ease venturumnl9 -- AI agreed with 
others in supposing thl>.t you would come in full force to Corfinium," and he is 
still indignant over the abandonment of Rome snd Italyz 
Suaplcionem nullam habebam, te rei publicae causa mare transiturum, eram-
que in spe magna fore ut in Italia possemus aut concordi~m oonstituere 
••• aut rem publicam summa cum dignitate defendere.20 
18 That this was Pompey's view of the situation will be shown in a 
aubs~qU&lt chapter, where some of his own letters are discussed (see below 
90-93). 
19 Cicero, Aa Att. viii.lld. 
20 Ibid • 
..... 
'lit 
I had no idea that the st8.te's 'WelfClre would teke you act'oss the sea, and 
r wa.s .in great hope that in Italy we should be uble to restore [mrmony 
• • • or fight most honorably for the commonwealth. 
i:.arly in March, while Pompey was still in Brundisium, Cicero descr.ibes him as 
) I ~ 
If C(f'TP'" T, r~ TOT~ TOV ,,~ - "the pOOl~est 0.1' generals"; he had used the 
adjective before, but now it is in the superlative degree. A week later, he is 
angry at Pompey's IIte.IUerltatem, ignaviam, ne&legentiam"~~ - ·foolhardiness, 
listlessness, oarelessness"; 8nd fino.lJ.y, after the. lapse of another week, 
Pom.::'ey nnee ~uam. aliud in alio peceare desti ti V~3 - "has never oeased to 
commi tone blundeI' Clfter another. II 
By this time, Pompey luid eluded Caesar, who was besieging Brundi-
sium, and removed his foroes across the Adriatic. Of the subsequent military 
activities Cicero has nothing to say until after the battle of PharsaJ.ia. A 
letter of Nove.tuber, 48, gives an indicB:tion that Cicero realized that other 
fae"Lvrs tlu:.n Pompey' IS inoompetence were involved in his downfall; the low 
state of morale of his followers and his al.lles was one such' 
De Pompeii ex1tu mihi dubium numquam fu1t. Tents. Gnim desperetio rerum 
eius omnium regum et"populorum animos occuparat, ut, quocumque venisset, 
hoc putarem .futurum. 44 
About Pompey's end I never had any doubt. For despair of his success had 
so completely taken possession of the minds of all the kings and peoples, 
that r thought this would happen to him, wherever he might go. 
Somewoot the same thought is developed more at length in a letter of May, 46, 
~1 Ibid., 16. 
22 ~., ix.5. 
~3 Ibid., 10 • 
.(4 Ibid., rl.6. 
alrnoat 'ti10 yea~s after Phars~uia. After Pompey had lett Italy and taken up El 
position at Dyrrhacbium 1.."1 Illyria, he was eventunlly joinec, by Cicero, who, 
long after the event, thus describe!:, hiD l.nlpressions on his arrival. at Pom-
Primum neque magnas copias nsque bellicosas: deinde extru ducem paucosque 
pr'aeterea - de principibus loqlJOr - reliqui primum in ipso bello rap&.-
ces, deinos in orations ita crudeles, ut ipsam victoriam horreremt maxi-
mum autem aes alienurn amplissimoI'1.Ull virorum. Quid quaeris? Nihil boni 
praeter causam. 2S 
In the first place, I founa that the troops were neither numerous nor in 
good fighting trim; secondly, apart frol.\i the cOIiilllander and some few otherl 
(I am speaking of the leadin~ men), the rest were, firstly, 80 greedy of 
lo.;)t dw'ing the campaign i tseU' and, secondly, so bloodthirsty in the way 
they spoke, that I shuddered at thf; thouliht of sven victory itself'; and 
last but not least, there was the insolvency of men of the highest rank. 
In short, there was nothing sound at~ut them but their cause. 
Under such circumstanoes, Pompey engaged in 5. minor skirmish I'll th Caesar's 
troops ~"1d came off victorious' this, in Cicero.s opinion, was fatal, for 
"coepisset allis militibus confidereh26 -- Nhe began to have confidence in rds 
lIenn and thereafter "signa tirone at collecticio exercitu cum legionibus 
robustissimis contuli V;(7 - "with raw and ht:~stily levied troops, he gave 
battle ~o the toughest legions." 
The twenty-odd passages cited in the foregoing pages constitute all 
the infor-m.a.tion that the letters of Cicero furnish as ,5. basis for judging his 
OPinion of Pompey's military ability; it is unfortunate that the majority of 
them r'ofer to only the last two years of Pompey' 8 life, for the opinions 
25 Cicero, AS. i'am. vii • .,. 





ex.r::resseu a.:::-c w:i thout 8. doubt colored by Cicel~o t s despLJir for the "loyalist" 
C6.U;3e. Yet, df::spite his apperent lack of confidence in PompE;yts competence and 
h1s dissatisfaotion with his operations, it a.ppears beneuth the surface that 
until the very end it was on Pompey, and on Porupey alone, that Cicero relied 
f01' the salvution of the republic. The repeated references to Poropeyt s activi-
ties seem to indicate this: what Pompey wa.s doing was of supreme importance. 
Moreover, the fact that finally, after much wavering, Cicero joined Pompey's 
i.'orces at Dyrrhacbium shows that he still had hop i3 in Pompey's ultimate tri-
umph; it was only after he saw there the poor quality of Pompey's offioers and 
man that Cicero realized that the cause was lost. In the absence of any furthe 
evidence, therefore, it may be conjectured that Oicerats true opinion of Pompa 
as a solciier was a moderate one and. takes its place somewhere between the 
exubet'ance of the f:;:o ~ Manilis. and the ·poorest of generw.stl of the 
letters. pro~lbll closer to the lutter than to the former. 
The evidence for the determinntion of Cicero.s opinion of Pompey's 
stateSlIllillship is somewhat more abundant: politics and statecraft were Cicero's 
life, &.no there io hardly a letter that does not contain some re.ferenee to the 
political situation of the times. Inasmuch as Pompey' played a prominent part 
in that political situation, :his frequent appeal'ances in Cicero's correspond-
enoe are t.o blil expected. 
It is to be noted, however, that the letters a.re concerned with only 
what may bt: called the second phase of Pompey's poli tical oaree~. He had begun 
his political c:..ctivity on his return from the cs..n.paign agtdnst Sartorius in 
Spain ~d ill the year 70 had served as consul. Subsequently, he was absent 
trom Borne for .five years on the campaigns against the Cilioian. pirates and 
ft 
: .. ithl.'id.:;..tes. NO;1, of this ea:d.r stage of his cart.'er there is, of C0UI'Se, no 
l·(;Go ... ~d in Cicero's letters, for, as has been not.:;,d, the extant correspondence 
dJ;..';.-: not. begin ll.."ltil the year 63 &"1.d not with 'i;l.ny regularity until the yeer 
6:2. T1w first letter of the latter year is the one addressed to Pompey at the 
Gonclu.sion of the campaigns in the EastJ~8 it is a bid .for friendship and 
political allirulct:l and embodies the hdpe tr.at Cicero and POnll)ey will a;3 per-
fectly complement each other as did Laelius and At'ricanu5. A few months later, 
wh<m Pow;;>f.;y has retu.cn~d to .Rome, Cicel'o is incli..."led to believe that the great 
) ... \... ~ has "nibil 6.v Toes nOI\.ITll<o,~ honeatum""'7 - Rno politiael morality," 
but he reserves his judgwent for the time being: tlhaec ad te sex'iOOm alias 
subtiliua, num noque adhuc mihi satis nota suuV.30 - ·on these points r shall 
w:..-ite to you more minutely at another time, for they s.re not yet Q.uite clear 
to ~~.n Next, Cicero describes to Atticus the effect of Pompey.s first public 
Non iucunda miseriB, inroiis improbis, beatis non grata, bonis non gravis. 
i taque i'rigebat.3l 
The poor did not relish it, to the disaffected it was pointless, the rich 
~~ .... annoyed, the better class of citizens thought it shallow: and so it 
fell flat. 
The S~~ letter also criticizes a haughty and non-committal reply o.f Pompey to 




~us.esivit.ex iilO plscere:tne ei iudices .u. praetore legi, quo consilio idem 
praetor uteretur. Id autem erc.t do Olodian.e. religione fl.t sena.tu const! tu-
tum. 'I'Um Pompeius.....,~X "ptrTOKp.t.TlkW!a locutus est senatusque aueto-
ritatem sibi omnibus in rebus maxim! videri semperque Tisam esse respon-
dlt at 10 multis verb1s.J~ 
He was asked whether he agre~d ttLat the jurymen shoul.d be chosen by the 
praetor and then used by the same praetor as his panel. (That was what 
had been already decided upon by the senate respecting Clodius's saeri-
le~e.) Thereupon, Pompey spoke in a t high and mighty' manner and replied 
that at all times and in all matters he had the highest respect for the 
s.anc.te·s authority - and very long-winded he was about it. 
Some time later, Oicero f'inds corroboration of his charge that Pompey waa 
lacking in political morality' 
Nunc est exspectatio com1tiorum, in quae omnibus inTitis tl~dit noster 
Magnus Auli filium, atque in eo nsque auctoritate nsque gratia pugnat, 
sed quibus Philippus omnia castella expUi:,>uari dicebat • .33 
Now ever;! one is looking forward to the elections I our Magnus is pushing 
Aulus' s son amld::;t general. diaapprovu - and the means he is using are 
n6i the:r- his prestige nor his popularity, but thosewhieh Philip said 
would storm any fort. 34 
Thus, by the beginning of the yfJ6.r 60, it appears to Cicero that 
Pompey has disqualified himself for the position ot first man of the state. 
The ineptness of his public appearances and his unsavory and unpopular support 
of A.fr&nius (i'Aulus' s son") for tho consulship had caused the great men to go 
into partial retirement, where, according to Cicero, he sulked in the expecta-
tion that th8 fame of his .former glo:r,y would once again oall him to the forea 
, ~, • r' " " ," - ~. t t r,' t t no).. 'TtN.~ oI"tP .U~ o"f!(P qUl.squa.ra J..nves..u.rl. po €s • ,.ill po era, •• 
33 Ibid., 16. 
34 1. e., bribery • 
..... 
ft 
Pompeius togulam illam pictam silentio tuetur suam.3S 
Not the ghost of 8. real statesman is to be found. The marl who could be 
one, ••• Pompey, wraps that precious triumphal cloak of bis around him 
in silence. 
However, he is soon back again in the arena, where his personal popularity is 
still great but his political maneuvers are meeting with increasing suspicion 
and hostility. 
Agraria. lex a Flavio tribuno plebis vehementer agitabatur auctore Pompeio 
quae nihil populare habebat praeter auctorem. • • • Huic toti rationi 
agrarias senatus adversabatur, suspicans Pompeio novam quamdam potentiam 
queeri.36 
The agrarian law w~s ze.uously pushed by the tribune Flavius with the 
suppo;.:'t o£ Pompey, though its only claim to popularity was its supporter. 
• • • The senate was opposed to the whole agrarian scheme, suspecting 
that Pompey was aiming at getting some new powers. 
Not long after this letter, Pompey joined Caesar and Crassus in the coalition 
that is known as the Fil~st Triumvirate. That he was aiming a.t more than lawi'ul 
political power is the growing conviction of Cicero at this time. This is seen 
first in the spi theta applied to Pompey, epi theta reminisoent of his virtually 
kingly powers in the Asiatic realms which he conquered I he is called JfHieroso-
lymarius traductor ad plsbemJf37 -- Qthe Jerusalemitish plebeian-maker,-)8 
)5 Cicero, A£ Att. i.18. 
)6 Ibid., 19. 
)8 Pompey is called a plebeian-maker in reference to his sanction-
ing of Clodiusts adoption into the elebs, a move that was to result in Cicero'. 
exile. 
. ~~ 0 IIStlmpsiceramuB~""7 - "the: Pasha, II and "Arabarches."4 Then he comes in for tois 
share of the general condemnation of the coalition, besides being berated 
individually for his tyranny. The tl'iwnvirs are htris homines immoderatosll41 
- tfthree unscrupulous men"; their rule is a I!regnumJt4( - "despotismn; "num-
quam hue veni$sent, nisi ad alias res pestiferas aditus sibi compararentn43 __ 
"they would never have gone to such lengths as they have, were they not paving 
the way fo:.~ other pernicious acts"; ftneminem tenant voluntate, ac ne matu 
n~cesse sit iis uti vereorn44 -- "they hold no one by affection, and I feer 
they will be forced to use terror." As fo~ Pompey personally, "timendum ••• 
ne • • • mere incipia.t"45 - "it is to be feared • • • that • • • he is about 
to run amuck" j "turbat"46 -- "he is stirr'ing up trouble, JI and JlTU,1( V~ I~e( 
'ul' It I"':S I:rtt ( "47 - "he is planning to usurp kingly power." The result of 
Pompey's and his fellow triumvirs' machinations was a great loss of popularity 
for the three' 
De re publica nihil hlibeo ad te scribere, nisi summum odium omnium homi-
39 Cicero, .M. Att. ii.14, 17, ~3. 
40 Ibid., rl. 
41 Ibid., 9. 
4;( .li?iQ.. , 1.3. 
4.3 ~., 17. 
44 Ibid., 19. 
45 Ibid., 14. 
46 Ibid., 17. 
47 Ibid • 
..... 
ft .• JO: 
num in ooS. qui too en t on1llJ.a."t'J 
I Imv~ no political news except that the present masters of the world 
have the worlats hatred. 
e.nd for POill.pey indi viduallya 
Quante in odio noste:r amicus f~agnus, cuius cognomen una cum Crassi Divi-
tis cognomina consenesci t149 
How greatly hated is our friend wagnus, whose surname is becoming as 
obsolete as Crassusts surname Divesl 
This fall from pre-eminent esteem was more than Pompey could bear, Cicero 
rel&tesl "taedet ipsum Pompeium vehementerque paen1tet"'O -- "Pompey is dis-
gusted and heartily sick of it all," and again& tlnostrum. emicum vehementer sui 
status paen1tere restituique in sum locum cupere, ex quo deciditn,l -- "our 
friend is heartily sick of his position and wants to be restored to the place 
from which he fell. tJ In fact, the ignominy to which Pompey has come 1s 50 
great that. aomt.: fear must be entertained as to his future course of actions 
-
Ille amicus noster, insolens infamies, semper itl la.ude versa,tua, circlJ.'lll-
fluens glol'ia, defo.rma.tus corpore, fractus animo, quo ee conferat nescit; 
progressum pra.ecipltem, inconstantem reditum videt: bonos inimicos habet, 
imp:robos ipsos non amicos. • • • Timeo tam vehemena vir tsmque ILeaI' in 
ferl~o at tam insuetus contumeliae ne omni impetu dolori at iracundiae 
pa.reat.S2 
Ou:c friend, being unused to unpopularity and having alwa.ys lived in an 
atmosphere of flatter! and glory, disfigured in person and broken in 
spi.d t, does not know what to do with himself: he sees that to advance is 
48 Ibid., ~. 
49 Iba:d• , 13. 
50 Ipid., u_ 
51 rb~d., ;(.3. 
52 Ibid., .21. 
ft dangerous, to retreat a confession of weakness; the respeotable parties 
are his enemies, the very riff-raff not his friends. • • • I am afraid 
that, since he is so impulsive and ready to draw the sword, as well as 
so unused to abuse, he may give full reins to his indignation and wrath. 
The letters of the next two years (58 and ;7) ignore Pompey all but 
completely' for the better part of that period Cicero lias in exile, and the 
principal burden of his correspondence is his own misfortune; the few refer-
ences to Pompey touch on his part in the exile and the possible, though not 
too sanguinely' hoped-for, return. 
Early in the year 56, whan Oicero was again in Bome, occurred the 
trial of tilo on a charge of .!i.il, brought by Clodiua. On the surface, the 
trial was merely a contest between rival hoodlums, aotually it represented th 
eve.:r-preStmt and ever-growing antagonism between the "baTeS" and the IIhs.Ve-
nots," which was to burst forth into civil war and a personal oontest for 
supremacy between Caesar and Pompey. Clodius was Caesar's man, and Pompey saw 
fit to support and defend Milo. Cicero, in a letter to his brother, gives an 
account of the trial and displays Pompey in a muoh more favorable light than 
he had previously' 
-
Dixit Pompeius sive voluit. Nam ut surre.x1t, operae Clodianae c181llorem 
sustulerunt, idque ei perpetua oratione contigit, non modo ut acclama-
tione, sed ut convitio at maledictis impediratur. Qui ut peroraTit --
nam in eo sane fortis futt, non est deterritus, dixit omnia atque inter-
dum etiam silentio, cum auctoritate peregerat •••• '3 
Pompey spoke, or rather such was his intention. For when he got up, 
Clodius t s hirelings rEdsed a yell. and that is what he had to endure 
throughout his speech, beiug interrupted not only with shouts, but with 
insults and abuse. When he concluded {he showed great fortitude in the 
Circumstances, he never quailed; he said all he had to say -- even, at 
times, amid silence; and he carried the thing through with an air of 




authority) .. • • • 
Nevertheless, this defense of Milo was apparently pleasing to no one' 
Apud perdi tissimam illam atQ.ue infimam faecem populi propter lUlonem sub-
offend1t, at boni multa ab eo dasiderant, multa reprehendunt.54 
For Milo.s sake he has given offense to the lowest and most abandoned 
dregs of the populace, while right-minded citizens find much wanting in 
him and much to censure. 
And, shortly thereafter, Cicero renews his old charges a~ainst the triumvirsl 
Non est credibile quae sit perfidia in istis principibu8, ut volunt esse 
at ut essent, 8i quidquam haberent fidei.55 
One could scarcely believe the amount of treachery there is in those 
leaders of the state, as they wish to be -- and might be, if they had any 
principle of honor in them. 
However, during the course of this year (56), a change took place. The trium-
virs, in a meeting at Lucca, renewed and strengthened their pact: Caesar 
secured the prolongation for five years of his Gallic command and Pompey and 
Crassus obtained the consulShip for the following year. And Cicero, making 
what appears to be a complete volte=face, now gaye his support to the COl:11i-
tionl A letter late in the year 54 giyes his apologia for this tergiversation; 
what is noteworthy therein is the manner in which he now speaks of Pompeyi 
-
-
Cum autem in re publica Cn. Pompeius princeps esset vir, is qui bane 
potentiam at gloriam maxjmis in rem publicam meritis ••• esset consecu-
tus • • • , non puta~ • • • .56 
Since the lead1n~ man in the state was Gnaeus Pompey, a man who had 
gained such power and eminence as he had b,y the highest public services 
• • • , I did not think • • • • 
54 lliS.. , 4. 
55 Cicero, Mill. iy.5. 
56 Cicero, M lam. i.9. 
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Perhaps OiCerO"8EiVV that the triumvirate was soon to dissolve and that POIDl;ey 
could be won to the support of the established regime. At any rate, the co ali 
tion did shortly cease to be: the death of Caesar's daughter J"ulia, Pompey' 8 
wife, severed one strong bond of the alliance; not long afterwards, Ore.ssus 
was killed in battle against the Parthians; Caesar's long absence in Gaul and 
his growing belief that Pompey was intriguing against him in Rome (as he by 
his agents was intriguing against Pompey) further widened the breach. it is 
not certain that the two ever met again after the oonference at Lucca. It was 
not long in becoming evident that their antagonism was to develop into active 
enmity and precipitate civil war. As the crisis approached, Cicero placed 
every confidence in Pompey; in May, 51, he writes to Atticus. 
~go cum triduum cum Pompeio et apud Pompeium tuissem, proficiscebar Brun-
disium •••• Civclm illum egreBium relinQuebam et ad haec, quae timentur, 
propulsanda paratissimum.'7 
After spending three days with Pompey at his house, I started for Brundi-
sium. • • • I left behind me a noble citizen, well prepared to ward off 
the dangers we fear. 
In July, to his long-time friend Caelius Rufus, whose own opinion of Pompey 
will b~ put in evidence in the following chaptera 
T&ntum habeto, civem egregium esse Pompeium at ad omnia, quae providenda 
aunt in re publica, et animo et consilio paratum.S8 
Of this much you may be sure, that Pompey is an excellent citizen and haa 
the courage and foresight to take any precautionary measure necessitated 
~J the politioal situation. 
kld in February, 50, to Atticus again. 
57 Cicero, ~A1i. v.7. 
58 Cicero,.&i lY.. ii.8. 
In Pompeid te "pam omnem otii ponere non miror' ita res est removendumque 
censeo illud 'dissimulantem.'S9 
I am not surprised that you depend entirely on Pompey for keeping the 
peace. That is <,tuite right, and I think you Blust delete your phrase 
'insincere.' 
In the following December, however, less than a month before Caesar made his 
gamble and crossed the ~ubicon, Cieer? is not so sure of Pompey's keepini the 
pe&ce and he so informs Atticus. 
~uod quaeris ecquae spes pacifieationis sit, quantum ex Pompeii multo et 
aocurato serlllone perspexi, ne voluntas quidem est. 60 
For your quer.y as to the chence of a peaceful settlement, so far as I 
could tell from Pompey's full and detailed discourse, he does not even 
want peace. 
But rompey's reasons were cogent enough to oause Cicero to go on to says 
Levabar cura, virum fortem et peritum et plurimum auotoritate ltlentem 
audiens 1101\ 'TIIC~~ de pacia aimulatae perioulis diaserentell. 
I was relieved of anxiety as I listened to a man of oourage, military 
skill and supreme influence discoursing in a statesmanlike way on the 
risks of a hollow peaoe •. 
After Caesar had, in effeot, deolared war upon the republic by lead-
ing his troops into Italy, Cicero's opinion ot Pompey's statesmanship began to 
deteriorate. Or rather, perhaps, in consequence ot his dissatisfaction with 
Pompey's mili ts.ry operations, Cicero allowed himself to be more outspoken in 
his criticism of the general's administrative abilities and policy of goyern-
.ent. Much of what has already been said, in the letters oited in the first 
-
59 Cicero, ~~. vi.l. 
(:() ~., Tii.d. 
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part ot this chapter,61a concerning Pompey's military ineptness in the con-
flict with Caesar might be applied with equal force to his administrative 
policy. Cicero does not clearly single out this or that facet of Pompey'a 
activities for criticism, but in his indignation lashes out indisoriminately 
in all directions, so that it is sometimes difficult to determine exactly what 
. 
is the particular source of his wrath of the moment. Such an ambiguous state-
ment is the following. ·ut enim alia omittam deoem annorum peocata, quae con-
dicio non hulc fugae praestititt a62 -- ·passing over other faults of the last 
ten years, what compromise were not better than this flight?" Although there 
is here a detini te reference to mill taq operations (the withdrawal from Bome) 
it seems rather that the criticiSE reflects Pompey's inabllity to forestall 
the war qy political craft, as such, it contradicts the letter cited immedi-
ately above, in which Pompey'iS preference for war oyer a feigned peace meets 
with Cicero's approval. However, there are other letters which are decidedly 
explici t in their condemnation of Pompey's statecraft; one complaint is that 
he himself has raised up the engine of his own destruction: "cum oumes CaesB-
rem lIletuebamus, ipse sum c:U.ligebat,,63 - "when we were all afraid of Caesar, 
he cherished him.. This charge is later expanded in detail. 
-
Istum in rem publicam ille alult, auxit, armaYit, 1118 lesibus per "lim et 
contra auspicia ferendis auctor, ille Galliae ulterioris adiunctor, ille 
gener, ••• ille provinciae propagator, ille absentia in omnibus adiutor, 
idem etiam tertio conaulatu, postquam esse defensor rei publicae coepit, 
~\tJ~ 
V LOYOLA ~ 
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contendit ut decem tribuni plebis ferr~t ut absentis ratio haberetur, 
quod idem ipse senxi t lege quadam sua. tl4 
Caesar wa.s Pompey's man. Pompey raised him to place end military power, 
assisted him in passing laws b.Y foroe and despite bad omens, granted him 
Further Gaul in addition to his province, Pompey married his daughter; 
••• Pompey prolonged the tenure ot Caesar's provincial government; 
Pompey championed his cause in absencE'l, likewise, in his third consul-
ship, when he began to be the defender of the constitution, he struggled 
to get the ten tribunes to propose a bill admitting Caesar's candidature 
in absence, and ratified that p~ivilege by a law of his own. 
Another source of displeasure is Pompey' s e.mbi tion, to Oi cero, he is grasping 
at absolute dictatorship. 
Dominatio qua.esi ta ab utroque est, non id actum, beata at honeat.a civ1 taB 
ut esset. Nec Vero ille urbem reliquit, quod eam tueri non posset, nee 
ltal1am, quod sa pelleretur, sed hoc a primo cogituv1t, amues terrae, 
omnia maria movere, reges barbaros incitere, ,entes feras armatas in 
Italiam adducers, exercitus conficere maximos. Ge%us illud Sullani regni 
iam pr1dem appetitur •••• Uterque regnAl'e vult. , 
Absolute power is what he and Caesar have sought} their aim has not been 
to secur0 the happiness and honor of the community. Pompey has not aban-
doned Rome because it was impossible to defend, nor Italy on forced com-
pulsion; but it was his idea from the first to plunge the world into war, 
to stir up barbarous princes, to bring savage tribes into Italy under 
arms, and to gather a hUge &rm1. A sort of Sullats reign has long been 
hie object. • • • Both want to be kings. 
}firand~ enim in modum Gnaeus noster Sulltmi repi simili tudinem coneu-
piv1t. 
It is amazing how our friend Pompey bas longed to duplicate Bulla's reip 
Regnandi contentio est, in qua. pulsus est modestior rex et probior et 
integrlor et is qui nisi v1nc1t nomen populi Ro~ deleatur necesse estl 
sin autem vincit, Sullsno more exemploque vincet. 67 
64 l..1>.;I&..,.3. 
65 lJ;?J&,., 11. 
66 llli., ix. 7. 




It is a struggle for royal power, a struggle in wluch reverses have 
plagued the more moderate king, the more upright and honest, the one 
wlIDse defeat means that the very name of the Roman people must be blotted 
outJ yet, if he wins, he .'ill use his victory after the manner and exam-
ple of Sulltl. 
It is noteworthy in this passage that, although Cicero decries Pompey' 5 ambi-
tion, he must needs still praise l'J.m as modesty.s, probus and ;1;g;;!;eger. Finally, 
Oicero seems to sum up his whole opinion of Pompey at this time in the follow-
J \ I 68 ing statement: 'hominem .. 1fo'" r ucwT'.cTo" omnium iam ante cognoram" - "I 
have long known him to be the poorest ot statesmen." 
The last half-do Ben letters quoted, all addressed to Attious, date 
from Ji'ebruary, March and April of 49. thereafter, events aoved rapidly to Pom-
peyts ultimate defeat and deeth. No further mention is made ot his stat€:cra.ft 
until more than two years &fter Pharsalia, then Cicero, discussing the trium-
"irate, sayse 
Pluximi sunt testes mEl at initio, ns coniungeret se CUlll Caesare, monuisse 
Pompeium at postea, ne seiungeret. coniunctione trana1 senatu3 opes, dis-
iunotione civile bellum excitari T1debam.69 
There are a large number ot people who can testify that, though at the 
beginning I warned Pompey against a coalition with Caesar, I atterwards 
warned him not to break with him. I ~w that the coalition meant the 
crushing ot the senate's power. and a rupture the stirring up at a civil 
WS.l.~ • 
, little more than two years later, when Caesar too was de~d, the seme point 
1.e made in one of' the speeches against Jmtony: 
Meaque illa vox est nota multisl 'Utinam, Pompei, cum Caesare societatem 
a.ut numquam eoisses aut numquam direaissesl Fuit alterum sraT1tatls, 
6a ~., viii.16. 
69 Cicero, &i lY.. Vi.c. 
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alterum p~dentiae tuae •• 70 
.And my saying at that time is known to many: • Pompey , would that e1 thar 
you bad never joined in partnership with Caesar, or had never dissolved 
itl The one course would have shown your steadfastness, the other your 
.foresight. 
The same speech also refers to a lack of judgment on Pomp~¥'s part that has 
already been touched upon in the lettersJ he had been advised 
unum, ne quinquenn1i imperium Caesari prorogaret, alterum, ne pateretur 
ferri ut absentis eiue rntio haberetur.71 
not to extend Caesar's command for tive years and not to tolerate a pro-
posal that Caesar·. candidature should be recognized in his absenee. 
Now, therefore, what conclusion i8 to be drawn from the letters that 
have been cited touchiIl& on Pompey's statecraft? .As in the matter of his gen-
ere.lship, here too there is uncertainty and contradiction. He has no political 
.orality.7~ he stoops to bribery in elections,7) in conjunction with his fell01 
triumvirs he is treacherous,74 despotic7S and unscrupulous,76 yet he is moder-
ate, upright and honest,77 he bas performed the highest public serTices,78 he 
70 Cicero, k!. MtoN=US! Orationss PhiliRPig"i ii.10. 
71 1lY&i. 
7~ See above ~ and n. 29. 
73 See above ~S and n. 33. 
74 See above 30 and n. "~a 
7' Bee aboTe Z7 and n. 42. 
76 See above 27 and n. .41. 
77 See above 34-3' and. n. 67. 
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is well prepare~ for guiding the state through any oontingencies,79 he oan 
diseuse ~ situation in a statesmanlike manner,SO his publio utterhnces ere 
sometimes pompous and platitudinous,Sl sometimes oalm t~d impressive;82 he is 
dictEl.torial and ambitious ot supreme dominion;8.3 withal, he is the poorest of 
statesmen.84 Perhaps the best clue to Cicero's honest and sober opinion is the 
statement that Pompey oould be a real ~8tatesman were he not wra.pped up in 
silence in his triumphal cloak,S, he had capabilities, but his vanity - the 
sense of his own importance - led him astray; the loss of some of his popu-
larity drove him into the fatal alliance with Caesar. in his wounded pride, he 
raised up the monster that was to destroy him and the republie.S6 This, in 
Cicero f s opinion, walS hilS critical. failing; had he been DlOre endowed with SE!!-
x;tt&i. he would not have blindly placed himself in Caesar's hands and, had he 
been more endowed with prudentia, he would not have ~l8hed headlong into a 
.ituation that could only be resolved b,y civil war.87 ThUS, it may fairly be 
conoluded, Cicero looked upon ,Pompey as somew~t of an idol with olay feets he 
79 See above .31 and nne 57 and 58. 
BO See above 3~ and n. 61. 
81 See above 24-25 and nn. .31 and 32 • 
8~ See above 29-.30 and n. 53. 
83 See a.bove 34-35 and nne 65-67. 
84 See above 35 and n. 68. 
85 See above ~5-~6 and n. 35. 
86 See e.hove 33-34 and nn. 63 and 64. 
87 See above 35-36 and n. 70. 
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had the p<)tentie.lities of 8 great st':ltesman, on occasions he reduced thoe-e 
potential! ties to act, but in the grea.t crises he was found wanting. Tht'.t he 
was the poorest oi' statesmen is hardJ.y the expres:.;ion of Cicero. s ce,lculated 
judgment; it is an exaggeration born of exasperation and fear. 
It may be objected that the ch&ra.cterization of P01!l1)ey summed up in 
the preceding paragraph bristles wit~ too glaring inconsistencies to be reaso~ 
ably predicated of a single individual. The present writer well realizes this 
and presents the characterization not as objective fact but merely as the 
opinion of one men, Cicero, who may or may not have been calmly reasonable in 
the expression of his opinions. It must be admitted. however, that the incon-
sistencies of Pomp~1s character were numerous: the disagreement of modern 
authors in their evaluation of the manS8 testifies to this fact, as does the 
evidenoe of those ancient authors whose testimony will be the subject matter 
of the following chapter. Still, the apparent contradictions in t~a character-
isation of Pompey are so great that one must wonder how impersonal Cicero's 
Judgments actu.a.l.ly were. It is to be feared that too many of the thoughts he 
put to paper were a refleotion of the inconsistencies of his own nature. In 
his undoubtedly real concern tor the preservation of the republiC, in his 
&Dxious cere for his prestige and his reputation as the savior of the state, 
in the realisation of the inadequacy of his own statesmanship, he displays all 
the changes of mood, all. the alternations of optimism and despair, all the 
uncertainty and irresolution, which he seems to find in Pompei. It is llkely, 
therefore , 
-
that the inconsistencies of his criticism of Pompey stemmed from 
88 See above 3-;. 
, 
the rapid variations of his own enthusiasms and misgivings. Furthermore, 
Cicero must have seen in himself many of the failings with which he charges 
Pompey, and it may well be that, in his annoyance at his own insufficiency, he 
was setting up in Pompey a defense mechanism againet the weaknesses of his own 
character. Certainly, the fault which Cicero seems to consider dominant in 
. 
Pompey - an enggera ted van! ty and sense of one t s own importance - was the 
very fault which proved the stUll'lbling block: to the brilliance of his own 
career. 
The third aspect of Pompey to be studied is his personality and 
character as a man, apart from his military and political functions. Of course 
no man may be thus completely dissected and separated. into distinct and mutu-
ally exclusive segments. In Pompey, as in anyone, the aots of his public 
career spring from the personality of the man. Hence, a great part of what has 
already been said of his generuship and statesmanship 1s a revelation of his 
inner character. He has been shown to be vain and ambitious, moody and impul-
8ive, laoking in prudence and stability, but honest and honorable. No mention 
bas been made of loyaltYJ but he has been branded, with Caesar and Crassus, as 
treacherous. The citation of several more passages trom the letters may throw 
additional light upon these alleged oharacterist1c8, particularly the last. 
the letter to Pompey which has already been twice referred. to, that of the 
lear ~, 1s also pertinent herea 
Ad me autel1l litteras" quas misisti, quamq'tJ.Ul. exiguam signiticationem tuae 
erga me Yoluntat1s habebant, tamen mihi sci to iucundas fuisse • • • • Ac 
ne ignores quid ego in tuis litteris desiderarlm, scribam aperte, sicut 
et mea natura et nostra amicitia postulat. Res eas ,ess1 quarum aliquam 
in tuis l1tteris et nostrae necess1tudinis et rei publicae causa gratula-
~ _______ ----a 
ft 
tionem 8XspeataYi.S9 
Though your private letter to me contained a somewhat slight expression 
of your affeotion, yet I oan assure you it save me pleasure • • • • To 
let you know, however, what I missed in your letter, I will write with 
the oandor whioh 'lIlY own disposition and our common friendship demand. I 
did expeot some congratulation in your letter on my achievements, for the 
sake at onoe of the ties between us and of the republio. 
This letter, the first of several touohins OD the supposed friendship betweau 
. 
pompey and Oioero, seems to indicate that Pompey was oold and self-oentered} 
the following passages, however, are of a somewhat different tenors 
Pompeium nobis amioisaimum oonstat esse.90 
-
It is plaiA that Pompey is most kindly disposed to me. 
Nos, ut ostendit, admodum diligit, ampleotltur, a.mat, aperte laudatl 
ooculte, sed ita ut perspiouum ait, invidet.91 
He is to all appearanoes exceedingly fond of me, embraoes me, loves and 
praises me in publlo, whUe in seoret (though unable to disguise it) he 
is jealous of me. 
Utor Pompeio familiarissime.92 
I am on the best of terms with Pompey. 
Pompeius significat studium erga me non medioere.93 
The regard Pompey displays towards me is more than ordinary. 
PompeiuB &nat nos oarosque habet. ·Credis?f inquies. Credol prorsus mihi 
persuadet. • • • Clodius adhue mihi denuntiat perieulum. Pompeius adtir-
mat non ssse periouluml adiuratl addit etiam se prius occisum iri ab eo 
89 Cioero, AsllM.. v.7. 
90 Cicero, .M ill. i.12. 
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quam me vtola tum iri. 94 
Pompey shows me fr'iendship and affection. 08.n I belie'Ye him, you ask. I 
do believe him, he quite con'Yinces me •••• Clodius is still threatenina 
me with danger, while Pompey asserts that there is no denier; he swears 
it, adding even that be will not see me injured if it eosts him. bis life. 
POUlpelus de Clodio iubet nos esse sine cura at summam in nos benevolen-
tiam amui oratione significat.9' 
Pompey tells me to have no fear IJf Clodius, and shows me the gres,test 
good will whenever he speaks. 
Pompeius omnia pollicetur et Caesar, quibus e,o ita credo, ut nihil de 
B1$a comparatione deminuaa.9O 
Pompey makes all sorta of promises, and so does CaesarJ but my belief tn 
them does not go 80 far as to make me drop any of my own preparations.97 
Ostensibly, Pompey was Cicero.s loyal and devoted friend, ready to make any 
sacrifice tor the sake of that friendship) yet, Cicero is not too certain of 
what lias beneath the surface. he suspects the latent jealousy and will not 
rely too much on the friendship when danger threatens. His fears were justi-
tied, for, when shortly thereafter Clodius was able to force him to go into 
«lile, Pompey remained coolly aloof and, despite his previous protestations, 
ude no move to come to his assistance. 'l'h&t Pompey waa under the thumb of 
Caesar, who had his own reaaons for wanting Cicero out of the way, is apparent 
from a letter during the exile. 
-
Exspectationem nobis • • • attulerae, cum scripseras • • • causam no.tram 
Pompeium ccrte suscepturum et, simul a Caesara 81 litterae quas exapeota-
94 lW., 20. 
95 Iba,d., 24. 
96 Cicero, AS.~. lfitrEP 1.2. 
97 I. e., against the 8YOWed enmity of Clodius. 
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~ 
ret remissae essent, actorem etiam daturum. Utrum id nihil fuit an adver-
satae aunt Cael3ar'is lltterae?98 
Iou raised my hopes ••• by writing that ••• Pompey was surely going 
to take up my case and that he would appoint an acent as soon as he had 
received a letter which he was expecting from Caesar. Did it come to 
nothing? Or was Caesar's letter hostile? 
One wonders how much of the aforementioned evidence of Pompey's friendship was 
actually displayed by him and how much was fashioned out of Cicero' s own 
desil.'e to be associated with the first man of the state. Certainly, the actual 
pomp~i of 58, the year of Cicero's banishment, is more the Pompey of the 
letter of ~ than of the intervening letters. At any rate, from Cicero's point 
of viaw, Pompey stands charged with a treacherous breach of friendship. How-
ever, he afterwards partially redeemed himself by his successful efforts to 
secure Cicero's reoall. Cicero's feelings towards him are thereafter mixed, 
the breach of faith rankles, but the later service rendered weighs heavily. 
-
Pompeius a me valde contend! t de redi tu in grat1am, sed adhuc nihil pro-
feoi t nec, 6i ullam partem libertatis tenabo, proficiet.99 
Pompey is Ill8.king a atroJ::4& effort to become reeoncUed with me, but as yet 
has met with no success and, if I retain a particle of independence, 
never will. 
Quid in me florentem posset ostendit.1OO 
He showed what power he could wield against me in the hey-day of my 
career. 
Quamquam at Pompeio plurimum • • • debebam et eum non solum beneficio sed 
smore etiam et perpetuo quodam iudioio mao diligebam, tamen • • • in 
98 Cicero, AQ~. i1i.18. 
99 Cicero, As!~. F;:atrem iii.l. 
100 ~., 4. 
omnibus mOts sententiis de re publica pristin1s permanebam.101 
AltOOUih I was enormously indebted ••• to Pompey and was devoted to him 
not only for his services to me, but also from my own feelings and, so to 
speak, my unbroken admiration for him, nevertheless • • • I remained 
faithful to all ~ old political tenets. 
Unus Pompeiu8 me movet -- beneficio, non auctoritate.102 
Only Pompey weighs with me - for his past kindnesses, not for his public 
influenoe. 
Quod mea praedioatione factum esse scribi. magis quam illius merito, ut 
tantum ei deber. viderer, est ita. Eio illa extuli semper et eo quidem 
magis, ne quid ille superiorum mem1nisse me putaret. • • • Nihil me 
adiuvit, cum possetz at postea fuit amicus, etiam valda •••• Utinam 
tantum ego e1 prodesse potUissem, quantum mihi ille potultl I41hi tamen 
quod fecit gratiss1mum.103 
You say that I seem. to owe Pompey so much more because I say so than 
because he deserves it. You are right. I have always exaggerated his ser-
vices for fear he might think I remembered the past. • • • He failed to 
hall' me when he might. but afterwards he was Dl3'" friend, my very good 
friend. • • • Would that I were able to help him as much as he was able 
to help mel However, I am truly grateful for what he did. 
It is apparent that Cicero 1s unable to satisfy his mind about Pompey; the 18.s1; 
of the passqes just cited is. especially indicative of his contusion. He seems 
to be attempting to rationallae his feelin&s for Pompey, and yet, through all, 
he cannot suppress .. hat appears to be a real affection tor the man. This regard 
pe reveals more explicitly in several other letters, 
Tantum ••• meheroule amor erga Pompeium. apud me valet ut, qua.e illi 
utilia sunt et quae ille TUlt, ea mihi omnia iam et recta at vera vide-
antur.104 
101 Cicero, .:W.lIi.. 1.9. 
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~ heay~s, &ffection for Pompey is so powerful with me, that whatever is 
to his interest and whatever he wishes appear to me at once to be wholly 
right and reasonable. 
Ego pro Pompeio llbenter emori possum& facio pluris omnium hom1num 
nemineIlh lOS 
I can gladly die for Pompey's sake - there is no one in the world I hold 
dearer. 
Me una baeo res torquet, quod DOn omnibus in rebus labentem vel potius 
ruentem Pompeium tamquam unus manipularis secutua sim. • • • Nunc emergi t 
&mOl', nunc desiderium ferre non possum, nunc mild nih1l llbri, nihil 
lltterae, nibil doctr1na pl'Odest.106 
The one thi.ng that tortures me is that I did not follow Pompey like a 
private soldier, when he was slipping or rather rushing to ruin •••• 
Now my old love breaks forth: now I mss him intolerably: now books, 
letters, philosop~, do not help me one whit. 
Although these passages are for the most part subjective revelations of 
Cicero's own inner selt, they throw a bright light on Pompeyts charaoter. He 
IlUSt have been endowed with a most amazingly attractive personality to win and 
hold the esteem and &frection of Cicero in spite of all his rai 1:1 ngs - his 
aoodiness, his quick temper,· his instabill ty and imprw:ienoe, his fickleness 
and unfaithfulness. He must have been genial and &.frable, generous, intelli-
cent, possessed of good breedine; and a certain nobility of bearin& - in 
abort, all those qualities that win friends and would tend to Wluence a man 
ot Cicero's intelligence, sensi ti vi ty and ideals. To such quaJ.i ties he must 
baTe owed a great part of his general popularity. Some of them are mentioned 
by- Cicero in another work, a few years after Pompey's death, a.s being the 
.turt of which great orators are mad •• 
-
10; Cioero,.M A;U.. viii.2. 
106 ~., :Lx.10. 
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Meus aut~ aequalis On. Pompeius vir ad omnia summa natus maiorem dicendi 
gloriwn habuisset, nisi eum maioris gloriae cupidi tas ad bellioas laudes 
abatraxisset. Brat orations satie amplus, rem prudenteI' videbat, actio 
vero eius habebat et in voce magnum splendorem et in motu su.mmam digni-
tatem.107 
Gnaeus Pompey, my contemporary, destined 1:u nature to pre-eminenoe, would 
have enjoyed greater glory for eloquenoe had not ambition for still 
greater glor-,;{ drawn him off to the prizes of a military career. His lan-
suage bad some elevation and he possessed eood judgment in disoerning 
the question at issue, but ohie£ly a fine voice and great dignity of 
bearing made hie delivery impressive. 
Thus, Cicero has drawn in his letters the pioture of Ii most enig-
matic charaater in his portrayal of Pompey. On the Whole, although the por-
trait is hardly that of a "chevalier sans peur et sans reproohe, Jt it is not 
entirely displeasing. It has serious defects -- one espeoially serious, the 
betrayal of friendship -- and startlin~ oontrastsJ the oontradiotions are 
difficult to reconcile from Cicero's statements - it is pI'obable that he 
himSelf could not reconcUe them and that he never fully understood Pompey -
but the defects, even the most grievous one, are well overShadowed by other 
praiseworthy qualities. That the very victim of Pompey's personal disloyalty 
could so tar lose sight of that treachery in the man's other excellences that 
be could later express a willingness to die for his friend is high praise. 
that praise is finally summed up in a letter written shortly after Pompey's 
cieathl 
-
Non possum eius casum non dolare. hominem enim integrum at castum et 
gl'aVEWl cognoTi.10a 
I cannot help feeling sorry for his fate, for I knew him to be a man of 
107 Cicero" Dljj!.tU,g lxviii.239. 
lOB Cicero, AQ. ill. xi.6. 
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honor and high moral principle. 
CHAPTER III 
POMPEY; OTHER A.tWIENT TESTDiONY 
Apart from the letters and speeches of Cioero, there is not a large 
body of contemporary written ev1deno~ oonoerning the life and oharaoter of 
pompey. He is mentioned briefly in passing in Sallust'a Ca~!liQal in the 
,W.ston!, of Sallust he would no doubt have figured largely, but of this work 
only fragments are extant. The l3fUJ.,ym CixiJ.' of Caeaar naturally touohes a 
sreat deal on the oareer of PompeYI its value, however, is lessened in that it 
is the work of a politioal and milJ.tary riYal and, in some sort, a defense by 
that rival of his own aotivities. LiTY's work would have been a valuable 
source of information' he waa alre~ a boy of eleven when Pompey died, and 
during his youth and early manhood he would have had access to firsthand 
1nform.a.tion concerning the events of the last years of the Roman republic, 
unfortunately, all the books treating of those years have been lost. Thus, the 
aost abundant evidenoe of Pompey's life is found in the writers of the early 
,ears of the Christian era, and principall.y in those ot the first century 
1. D. These writers are for the most part historians, although other types of 
literature, even poetry, also furnish some witness ot Pompey's character and 
personality. Therefore, the writings of these ~uthors of the early Roman 
~ireJ together with what information can be gleaned from th~ earlier writers. 
I1U provide the basis for the study of Pompq in this chapter. 
47 
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~ As in the foregoing chapter, the question ot Pompey's generalShip 
will be the subject of the first part ot the discussion. Little contemporar,y 
evidence can be offered, but a certain Caelius Rufus, a correspondent of 
Cicero, is as oritical of Pompey's inefficiency at the beginning of the civil 
war as was Cicero himself, 
Ecquando tu hominem ineptiorem~quam tuum Cn. Pompeium vidisti, qui tantae: 
turbas, qui tam nugax esset, commont?l 
Did you ever see a more helpless fellow than that trifler who has stirred 
up so much confusion -- your friend Gnaeus Pompey? 
Even Caesar has little to say about Pompey's military operations, for he would 
naturally be little likely to lessen his own prestige by belittling the abil-
ity of his opponent. His critiCism, therefore, is by indirectionl 
PompeiuB ••• magnam ex Asia Oycladibusque insulis, 001'oY1'4, Athenia, 
Ponto, B1t~1a, Syria, C11ioia, Phoen10e, AeiYPto olassem coege1'at, 
magnam omnibus locis aediticandam curaverat; ma.gnam imper6.tam .biae, 
Syriae regibusque omnibus et dynastis et tetrarchis et liberis Aohaiae 
populls pecuniam exegerat, DJ.aillaDl societates earum pronnciarum quae ipse 
obtinebat sibi numerare coegerat.~ 
Pompey • • • had gathered a large fleet trom Asia and the Cyclades 
islands, from Ooroyra, Athens, Pontus, Bit~a, Syria, Cilicia, Phoeni-
cia and Egypt, and had arranged for the building of a large fleet wher-
ever possible; he had levied and collected a large sum of money from Asia 
Syria and all the kings, princes and potentates and from the tree commu-
nities of Achaea; likewise, he forced a large sum to be paid to him by 
the tax-assooiations of those provinces of whioh he had control. 
The implication is that Pompey, despite the fact that he had almost unlimited 
resources of men, ships and money at his command, still was no match for Cae-
1 Cicero, !S.lY.. viii.15. 




sar. Somewhat the same thought 1s found in the l>harsalia of Luc8.D.. 2a 
Interea totum Magn1 fortuna per orbem 
Secum casuras in proelia movera t urbes. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Non, cum Momnon1is deducens agmina regnis 
Cyrus et e£.fusis numerato mlite telis 
Descendit Perses traternique altor amoris 
Aequora cum tan tis percussi t classibus, unum 
Tot reges habuere ducem.3 
. 
Meanwhile, over all the earth the fame o.f Magnus had brought forth to 
battle na.tions doomed to share his fill. • • • Not eTen when Cyrus the 
Persian led his hosts from the realms of morning and came down with an 
a~ that was numbered by the casting of darts, not even when Agamemnon, 
avenging his brother's spumed love, smote the seas with such mighty 
.fleets, did so many kings obey a single leader. 
2a The introduot1on into the thesis of the first of those witnesses 
who were not contemporaries of Pompey and who, moreover, lived and wrote under 
the rule of eaperors who were the political heirs of l>ompey's conqueror raises 
the question of the reliability of such witnesses. Could they be trusted, 
~tivated as they quite likely were b,y tear or ambition, to treat of Pompey 
!W1 th an impartiall ty that might prove to the discredit of the first Caesar? A 
~rief notice is in order, therefore, of the ciroumstances of life and work 
that may have influenced each in his characterization of Pompey. 
Lucants epic on the civil war was written during the reign of Nero. 
!tn a short life of twenty-five years, the poet first enjoyed the favor and 
~timate friendship of the emperor, then he rebelled against that tyrantts 
!Lns&ne jealousy, scomed him and, finally, after entering into a plot against 
Ms life, was condemned to death. Depending, therefore, on the time of compo-
sition of the poem, which has not been definitely established, Lucan mayor 
!DaY not have been anxious to please Nero. The intemal evidence is as incon-
plusive. in almost the opening lines it is asserted that the Civil war was 
~orth all its toil and bloodshed, in so far as it paved the way for the advent 
~f a Nero (i.33-45), and there then follow some twenty lines of extravagant 
praise of the emperorJ yet, less than a hundred lines further on, in a por-
~rait that is anything but flattering, Lucan indicates that he was no admirer 
~~ the great Julius, characterizing him, finally, as one "gaudens ••• viam 
~~ci8se ruinaP (i.150). On the wbole, the poem is less pro-Cae~arian than 
,:~ht be expected, and the praises of: Pompey which the poet puts into the 
-uth of Cato (to be cited in the later pages of this chapter) warrant an 
llSu.ption of reasonable fairness on Lucan's part. 
~~ 3 Lucan i11.169-170 and ~84-288. The omitted verses of this passage 





Velleius Pateroulus,3a an historian of the early first oentury A. D., 
is the first of the non-contemporaries of Pompey to discuss him at any length. 
That this writer is a deoided admirer of Pompey is indicated in the opening 
~8ssage of his discussion of the mane 
Culus Tiri magnitudo multorum voluminum instar exigit, sed operis modus 
paucis eum narrari iubet.4 . 
A true portrait of the greatness of this man would require many volumes, 
but the scope of my work demands that he be mentioned in but a few words. 
The historian then goes on to say that Pompey's military ability was a product 
of three factors' he had been hs. toga Virili adsuetus commilitio prudenti8simi 
~ucis, parentis sui, ft5 -- "from early manhood assooiated in military affairs 
lith a most sagaoious commander, his father", he was possessed. of a "bonum et 
capax recta discendi ingen1umb6 -- "native talent that showed great capacity 
~o learn what was best".; and he enhanced that natural talent by a "singulari 
rerum militarium prudentiaM7 -- "remarkable insight into military tactios." 
3a Velleius' s compendium of Roman history was written during the 
reign and under the patronage of Tiberius. The historian had been a companion 
in arms of the emperor, had been associated in his triumphs and long enjoyed 
~s friendship.; were this not sufficient indioation of pro-Caesarian sympa-
~hies, the adulation of Tiberius which marks the work affords ample confirma-
~on. however, as will be seen in the following pages, Pompey fares better at 
~he hands of Velleius than of most of the other writers cited herein. Velleius 
~ have felt so seoure in his friendShip with Tiberius that he could venture 
to be oompletely outspoken; or, perhaps, he shrewdly calculated that the 
~eater the praises he bestowed upon Pompey, the greater would be the glory to 
~oorue to Pompey's conqueror and to that oonqueror's heirs. 





All trds brought about the result nut a Sertorio Metellus 1audaretur magis, 
pompeius timeretur validiusn8 -- nthat, although Sertorius bestowed the 
greater praise upon Metellus, it was Pompey he feared the more strongly." Thus, 
Velleius, in passing, as it were, and as a matter of course, easily resolves 
in Pompey's favor the much-debated question of that general's contribution to 
the reconquest of Spain. The repression of the Cilician pirates is also men-
tioned with but few details, as if the name of the commander were a suffioient 
guaranty of the sucoess of the campaign; but Pompey's subsequent action is 
singled out for particular praisel 
Reliquias eorum contractas in urbibus remotoque mari 1000 in carta sede 
constituit. Bunt qui hoc carpant, sed quamquam in auotore satis rationis 
est, taman ratio quemlibet magnum auctorem faoeret; data enim facultate 
sine rapto vivendi rapinis arcuit.9 
The remnants of the pirates he oolleoted and established in fixed abodes 
in oities far from the 8ea. Bome criticize him for this) but, although 
the plan is suffioiently reoommended by its author, it would have made 
its author great whoever he might have been, for, by giving the pirates 
the opportunity to live without brigandage, he restrained them from brig-
andage. . 
Here Pompey is shown to be capable not only of oonduoting a successful mil1ta~ 
campaign but, wbat is of greater importance, also of "winning the peaoe"; the 
ltatement i5 a Signal tribute to his administrative ability and indicates that, 
at least when on familiar ground, he was not devoid of statesmanlike qualities. 
The eastern campaign of Pompey against Mithridates and the allied potentates 
~elleiue treats somewhat more at length and with greater detail; two short 
ltatements, however, will suffioe to show his high regard for trds phase of 
-
8 Ib:i,d. 
9 Ibid •• 32. 
.,. 
Pompey's military career. 
Becuts deinde Cn. Pompeii militia, gloriae laborisne maioris inoertum 
est.10 
Then followed the military exploits of Unaeus Pompey in regard to whioh 
it would be difficult to say whether the glory they earned or the labor 
they cost was the greater. 
Tum Victor omnium quas adierat ientium Pompeius suoque et civium voto 
maior et per omnia fortunam hominis egressus I'evertit in ltaliam.ll 
Then, after conquering all the races in his path, Pompey returned to 
Italy, having achieved a greatness whioh exceeded both his own hopes and 
those of his fellow citizens and having, in all his campaigns, surpassed 
the fortune of a mere mortal. 
In regard to Pompe.yfs operations against Caesar, however, Velleius is not so 
enthusiastic; his reluctant criticism is directed principally against Pompey's 
apparent errors of judgmentl 
IL\l!llB.neJIl exercitum confeeerat et mare praesidiis classium, ut reb&tur, 
saepserat, quo minus Caesar legiones posset transmittere.l~ 
He had colleoted a formidable army and had with his fleets established, 
as he thought, a suocessful blookade upon the seas to prevent Caesar from 
transporting his legions. 
Vat Caesar was able to cross the Adriatic with the greatest of ea.se and to 
beSiege Pompey in DyrrhaohiumJ a skirmish followed, which was favorable to the 
Pompeian forces, and Caesar withdrew into Thessaly. Thereupon, 
-
Pompeiu5, longe diversa allis susdentibus, quorum plerique hortabantur ut 
in It&.liam transmitteret (neque heroules quidquam partibus lUis salu-
brius fuit), alii ut bellum traheret, quod dignatione partium in dies 




ipsis ma&is prosperum fieret, usus impetu 8UO hostem secutus est.l) 
Pompey, in spite of the contrary advice of others, followed his own 
impulse and set out after the enemy. Most of his advisers urged him to 
cross into Italy (nor indeed was there a.ny- course mors expedient for his 
party); others adVised him to prolong the war, which, by reason of' the 
esteem in which the party was held, was daily becoming more favorable to 
them. 
The 1mfilication here seems to be that Pompey's personal popularity and the 
. 
public confidence in his arms and esteem f'or the principles for which he stood 
were still so powerful that, were he to return to Italy and take up his stand 
as the defender of the fatherland, such support would rally to his standards 
that Caesar's power against him would fade away into nothingness. Yet, he 
elected to fly in pursuit of his adv-ersary and. plunge into battle on grounds 
of that adversary I s own chOOSing - with disastrous resul te. 
It has been pointed out above that Caesar disp1~ed great reticence 
in his writings in criticizing Pompey as a soldier} his verbal utterances, 
however, were apparently more outspoken, if creai t can be given to the reports 
of later historians. Suetonius,l)a in the early second century A. V., writes: 
Mi thridatis Magni f'ilium • • • mul tiplici suceesau praeferocem, intra 
quintum qUEtJil adf'uerat diem, quattuor quibus in conspectum velli t horis, 
une profligavit aci., crebro commemdrans Pompeii felicitatem, cui pI'ae-
13 .llis!., 52. 
13a The work of this author that is most pertinent to the present 
[c11scul5sion, the Liv" .Ql .:ta§. TIel!, Ciesar" dates from the reign of Hadrian, 
ODe of the so-called flgood fl emperors, whom Suetonius served foJ:' a time in the 
O&paoity of priv-a.te secretary. He may thus be presumed to have been pro-Cae-
~~i~. although he probably felt himself secure enough to write freely. 
~.rtainly, the discreditable and frequently scandalous anecdotes which are a t~llinent feature of his work do not indicate any great rev-erence for the 




cipua militias laue de tam imbelli genere hostium contigisset.14 
The son of Jdthridates the Great, flushed with numerous successes, Caesar 
vanquished in a single battle within five days after his arrival and four 
hours after getting sight of him, often remarking on Pompey's good luck 
in gaining his principal fame as a general by victories over such feeble 
foemen. 
The reference is to the defeat of Pharnacee at Zela, the battle of Caesar's 
famous -Veni, vidi, vici" message. Of ~Pompey' s failure to capitalize on his 
successful engagement at Dyrrbachium, Caesar is elso Ct'i tical, as Sueton1us 
reportsl 
Ipse prosperrime semper ac ne ancipi ti quidem fortuna p"I"aeT,C:i:>que.In his \ ! 
dimicavi tl semel ad Dyrrhachium, ubi pulsus non instante t'om~J,;;io negaYi t 
eum vincere soire.lS 
Caesar always fought with the utmost success, and the issue was never 
even in doubt save twice. once at Dyrrhachium, where he was put to flight 
and said ot Pompey, who failed to foliow up his suocess, that he did not 
know how to use a victory • 
.In the latter half of the second century A. D., a certain norus1;. 
wrote what purported to be an epitome of Liv,yJ just how much of florua's char-
aoterization of Pompey is owed to Livy cannot be ascertained, in view of the 
15 Ibid., ,36. 
15& Of this writer very li tUe is known, even his full and oorrect 
~e is uncertain. The consensus of opinion places him in the time of Trajan 
~r Hadrian, and by some he is identified with a poet of the SWlle name who was 
" f:;:':!.eud ot: Hadrian. Florus's own statemeat, however, would seEm!. to indicate 
that i! .. belongs to a somewhat later period. in his introductioll, he claims to 
be wri tine; a Ii ttle less than two hundred years from the time of Augustus, 
~hioh, depending upon the date in the life of Augustus from which norus reck-
~ed, could place his florq;i.~ anywhere from the time of .Hadrian to well into ~~ reign of Commodus or later. His possible associations, therefore, give 
IWotUe clue to his politioal sympathies. His work itself is claimed to be an 




loss of the pertinent books of the Ala ~ CQ.Qd1jr.a.. There is in Li."., however, 
a. mention of Pompey which reflects a. point made much of by Florua. Livy is 
discussing the factors of chief importance in war and singles out fortWla as 
being especially powerful; he points out that the fame of JUexander the Great 
rests in large measure on the fa.ct that he died While he was still the favor-
ite of Fortune, while the great Cyrus, on the other hand, was exposed by a too 
long life "vertenti ••• fortunae. R16 And Pompey the Great, continues the 
historian, recently experienoed the same lot. Now, of course, this eaphasis 
on the role of Fortune in the affairs of men was not & new idea offered to the 
Roman mind by LiT.YJ Cicel~J17 especially, had made Pompeyls good luck & strong 
argument in bis speeoh on the Manillan Law, and. other writers make at least 
passing referenoe to the good fortune which invariably accompanied Pompey, yet 
in the end overthrew hi.lll.18 Florus, whether following the lead of Livy or not, 
is emphatic in his referenoes to Pompey's good fortune, "quanta felicitas 
Tiri,"19 he eX~lai.llls, as he describes Pompeyts conquest of Mitbridstes. In 
fact, the whole Pontic campaign was but a means by which "decus et nomen et 
titul05 gloriae Pompeio suo fortuna quaerebat,,2Q -- "Fortune sought honor and 
tame ana distinctions for her own dear Pompey.- One wonders whether F10rus, 
16 Livy ix.17. 
17 Cicero, m ~ 19pi1h: OratiB XYi. 
18 See especially Juvenal x.~8S-286 and Velleius Paterculus i1.37, ~, 48, S3. 
19 Florus i.40. 
-
.,. 
in ascribing so-much of Pompey's suocess to divine assistance, is not deliber-
ately attempting to detract from the brilliance of Pompey's generalship, for 
the passage describing the battle in which Mithridate. met final defeat 
exhibits a curious inversion: 
Nocturne ea dimicatio tuit et luna in partibus. ~uippa quasi commilitans 
cum dea a tergo sa hostibus, a facie Romanis praebuisset, Pontici per 
errorero longius cadentes umbras duas quasi hostium corpora petebant.2l 
The engagement took place at night, and the moon took sides in it; for 
when the goddess, as if fighting on Pompey's side, bad plaoed herself 
behind the enemy and facing the liomans, the men of Pontus aimed at their 
own unusually long shadows, t.hinking that they were the bodies of their 
toes. 
It might ordinarily be supposed that a general of Pompey's reputation would 
have had some hand in the disposition of the battle lines and would not have 
left all to the chance ben1&nity of the fair Diana. It is likely that FloTUS 
.as so obsessed with the idea of Pompey's favor with the gods that he allowed 
himself to be swept away from reality, but he has, at any rate, even if unwit-
tingly, furnished evidence of one aspect of Pompey's strategioal skill. More-
oyer, the author is more dom to earth when he mentions another achievement of 
Pompey's in the same Mithridatio war, an achievement which may be favorably 
compared with Caesar's bridging of the Rhine. -Ponte naYibus fa.cto omnium ante 
Ie primus transiit l:.uphr8.tem"2~ - "he built 8. bridge of boats over the Eupbra-
\Is and was the first to cross that river by this means. ft For the war against 










ou1us,~3 for Pompey, after defeating the pirates, 
maritimum genus a conspect~ longe removit maris et mediterraneis airis 
quasi obligavit eodemque tempore et usum marie navibus recuperavit et 
terrae homines suos reddidit.~ 
removed this maritime people far from the silht of the sea and bound it 
down, as it were, to the cultiTation of inland districts, thus at the 
same time recovering the use of the sea for Shipping and restoring to the 
land its dwellers. 
It is difficult, continues FlONS, to determine what in this victory was most 
wortb1 of admiration -- its speedy accomplishment, the iood fortune which 
attended it, or its lasting effect, for ftamplius piratae non tueruntn2' --
"there never were any pirates again." When, however, the author comes to the 
diecussion of Pompey's war with Caesar, his opinion of Pompey sutters the 
acme deterioration that bas been already noted in Velleius Paterculus.26 He 
looks upon Pompey's withdrawal from Italy as a most disgraceful flight' 
Ille per obsesei claustra portus nooturna fuga evasit. turpe dictu. modo 
princeps patrum pacisque bellique moderator per triumphatum a se mare 
lacera et paene inermi nave fuaiebat. lec Pompeii ab Italia quam senatus 
ab urbe fuga turpior. 27 
He escaped by night through the entrance of the beleaguered harbor. A 
shameful tale, he who was but lately head of the senate and arbiter of 
peaoe and war fleeing, in a storm-beaten and almost disuntled vessel, 
over the aea which had been the scene of his triumphs. The flight ot the 
senate from the city was as discreditable as that of Pompey from Italy. 
let Florus acknowledges that, after the cJ:oasing to Illyria, Pompey pursued a 
23 See above 51 and n. 9. 
24- Florus i.41. 
.25 ~. 
.26 See above 52-53 and nn. 12 and 13. 
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careful and shr.ewd policy, whioh might have brought him ultimate victory had 
dB hand not been forced by the disaffection of his men. 
Pompeius • • • nectere moras, tergiversari, sio hostem interclusum undiqu 
inopia. commeatuum terere, usque dum ardent.issimi ducis consenesceret imp 
tus. Nee diutius pro.fuit ducis salutare consilium. Miles otium, socii 
moram, principes ambituw ducis increpabant. 28 
Pompey contrived delays and subterfuges and wore down the enemy, hemmed 
as they were on all sides, tu intercepting their supplies, waiting for the 
mO.lllent when the zeal of the impetuous Caesar should die down. But his 
salutary plan did not avail him very long} t.he soldiers complained of the 
inactivity, the allies of his dilatoriness, and the nobles of his 'playin 
to the gallery.' 
statement is in direct contradiction to the assertion of Velleius Pater-
ulus~ that Pompey rushed into battle against all advice to the contrary. The 
ruth is probably somewhere between. Cicer030 had said that in consequenoe of 
he skirmish at Dyrrhachium Pompey had begun to haYe confidence in his troops. 
t is likely, therefore, that his first operations on the far side of the 
;.riatic were cautious and studied, but that, under the goading of the more 
rresponsible members of his entourage, he grew deaf to the counsel of his 
abandoned b.1 his Fortune, succumbed to the ·praecip1tan-
ibus fatia,,'l and hurled himself into Thessaly and his doom. 
The final testimony to be offered concerning Pompey's generalShip is 
hat of .Eutropius,3la an historian of the fourth centUX"J A. D. He first refel~s 
~9 See above 5~-53 and n. 13. 
30 See above 22 and n. 26. 
31 F10rus 11.13. 
31a The question 
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to Pompey in connection with the Marius-Sulla conflict. It was to Sulla that 
bis services hed been offered by Pompey, 
quem adulescentem Sulla atque annos unum at Tiginti natum cognita aius 
industria exercitibus praefecarat, ut secundus a Sulla haberetur.,2 
whom, although but a young .IlI.aIl of twenty-one, Bulla, perceiving his ener-
getic eagerness, had put in charge of his troops, so that he was reckoned. 
second only to Bulla himself. 
His operations as Sulla's lieutenant weX's apparently 80 outstanding (Eutropius 
gives no details, merely states the fact) that 
Pompeius, quod null! Romanorum tributum erat, quartum at Ticesimum annum 
agens de Africa triumphavi t.33 
Pompey, although only in his twenty-fourth year, wa.s granted Ii triumph 
for Africa, a priTilege which had been accorded to no Roman before him. 
ror the war against Sartorius Eutropius see.'l1S to give Metellus and Pompey 
equal credit. Pompey was sent into Spain, he says, because Metellus singly was 
~hought to be unequal to the task} however, it was not so much Pompey, but the 
tact that Sartorius now had two generals arrayed against him, that caused that 
~ebel's downfall • .34 .And the war in Spain was brought to an end Dper On. Pom-
Caesar hardly arises in the c~se of Eutropius. He flourished towards the end 
~f the fOUl~th century A. D., when new tredi tiona and new problems were the 
~ri tage of the Roman world. A oentury of Itba.rrack" emperora had ended in the 
acoession of Diooletian, a man from the east, a can of peasant stock, who, in 
m effort to bolster the tottering empire against the onalausht of the barbar-
... ana poised on its borders, effectively destroyed its unity. The seat of gOT-
Irnment moved to the Bosporus, and Rome &nd its Caesars became lit memory. A 
~-oentury later Eutropius may have been devoted to the empire a.s to e. symbol 
~1' government but hardly to the dynasty of the Jullo-Claudians. 
32 1utl'opius v.8. 
33 !1;W!., 9. 




peium adulescentem at Q. Metellua Pium"':;' - "by the young Gnaeus Pompey and 
~ntus Metellus Pius." Of Pompey" suppression of the Oilician pirates Eutro-
piuS says only that the task was accomplished "intra paucos menses ingent! et 
felicitate et celeritate".:;6 -- ·with surprising success and dispatch in the 
course of a few months. 1f However, it is his conquest ot M1thridates and Tigra-
nes and his other eastern exploits that Eutropius seems to consider Pompey'. 
sreatest claim to fue, ii' one may judge from the proportionate amount of Spe.Cfi 
devoted to these campaigns and the details with which they are presented. The 
overthrow of 14ithrid.ates in a single battle by night., with the loss ot only 
twenty-two men as ai8inst aithridates's forty thousand,37 the suppression of 
Tigranee and the abridgment. of his power and wealth,38 the making and unmaking 
~f kings and pr1nces,39 the capture of Jerusalem40 -- these are the highlights 
of a campaign which gained for Pompey a triumph of which Eutropius says, "Nulls 
~quam pompa triumphi similis fu1t lf41 -- Dno triumphal proceSSion was ever 
equal to this." In his treatment of the civil war, Eutropius displays the same 
lack of enthusiasm which has been eYident in the citations noted above. He 
.,rely states facts, content to let any inference relative to the respective 
35 lW,. 
36 .lliS,., 12. 
37 Ib).d. 
38 ~., 13. 
39 ~., 14. 
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merits of Caesar and Pompey be drawn therefrom as the reader may see fit. 
Speaking of wh&t is obviously t.he battle of Dyrrbaehium, he says of Caesar, 
Primo proelio notus est et tugatu8, evasit tamen quia noote interveru.-
ente Pompeius sequi nolu1t, dixitque C~eaar nee Pompeium scire vincere et 
iUo tantum die se potu1sse superari.~ 
In the first battle he was defeated and put to flight, he escaped, how-
ever, because Pompey declined to pursue him, as the night was coming on; 
and Caesar remarked. t.hat Pompey ~kne .. not how to conquer and that on that 
day alone he himself could have been vanquished. 
Eutropius here repeats what had been said in almost the sam& words b.r Sueto-
nius,4.3 that, in Caesarts opinion, Pompey did not know how to follow up a 
victo1"Y. A rea.son is given for Pompey's failure to pursue Caesar, "the niiht 
was coming on," but the Latin construction does not make it clear whether t!~t 
reason is Pompey's or };.utropius's. Whether the reason is Qaequate is another 
question. Of the battle at Pharsalia there are no details beyond an enumeratio~ 
of the forces ranged on each side' Caesar had not qui t6 thirty thousand infan-
try and one thousand horse; Pompey had forty thousand foot soldiers and eleven 
hundred cavalry, 
praeterea totius orientis auxilia, totam nobilitatem,. innumeros senatores, 
praetorios, oonsulares et qui magnorum iam bellorum victores fuissent.44 
besides auxiliary troops from the whole east, all the nobility, senators 
without number, men of praetoritm and consular rank, and some who had 
alrea~J been conquerors in extensive wars. 
The evidence from the various wr1 ters 01 ted in the preceding pages 
lakes it clear that the detel."'l!l.in8.tion of the quality of' Pompey's generalship 
43 See above 54 and n. 1S. 
- IJ. Eutronius Yi. .. 20. 
..,. 
iP:resented a perplexing problem. Although there is hardly any unanimity of 
ppinion on a:n:y phase of his militarJ career, the greatest disc.::epancy is noted 
in the treatment of the earlier and of the later phases. The suppression of 
the Cilician pirates wins general praise not only for the speed end efficiency 
,,1th which it was accomplished, but also for the subsequent measures which 
assured a permanent end of the menac~. The eastern cwnPaiill against Mithridates 
and the other princes is also singled out for high praise. But when the discus-
~ion arrives at the ciYil war, the impression is given that the Pompey of the 
wears 49 and 48 is a different person altogether from the Pompey of 67 to 62. 
The criticism of the later Pompey is almost universally derogatory. he is 
;t.nept, confused, uncertain, fearful, at the mercy of his subordinates. The 
~pparent ohange in the man must have been a source of wonder and annoyance to 
~J it was particularly so to Cicero, as bas been pointed out in Chapter 
I.4S To Caesar, however, the development was seemingly no surprise, especially 
Iln view of his reported later statement that Pompey had gained his principal 
rame by victories over feeble foemen.46 So, from one point of vie., Pompey was 
a brilliant gen6ral who, for one reason or another, Md deteriorated in his 
~ter years to a fumbling ineptitude} from the other point of view, he had 
!lerely acquired a reputa.tion for mill tary genius which, when brought face to 
'ace with really excellent generalship, waS found to be fa.lse. In the next and 
~1nal chapter of this thesis, the evidence of Pompey's own few letters will be 
P~8ented and an attempt w11l be made to reconoile these conflicting viewa. 
45 See above 16 and n. 9. 
-
46 See above 53-54 and n. 14. 
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The portrait ot Pompey as a politician and statesman presents 
equally conflicting lights and shadows. The contemporary evidence is confined, 
after Cicero, to Sallust, Caesar and Marcus Caelius Rufus. Caelius, whose 
opinion of Pompey's generalship has already been referred to earlier in trds 
chapter ,47 was a younger contemporary and prot": of Cicero; a.l though he 
favored Caesar and openly attached himself to him in 49, he long maintained 
his friendship with Cicero and in the years 51 and 50 authored a series of 
letters to that statesman, who was then governor of Cilioi&, with the obvious 
purpose of keeping him abreast of affairs in the city. In one of the earlier 
of these letters he writes of Pompey: 
Solet enim aliud sentire at loqui neque tsntwn valere ingen10 I ut non 
appliU'eat quid cupiat.48 
As a rule, he thinks one thing a.nd says enother, and yet he is not quite 
clever enough to diseuise tds desires. 
The best interpretation that can be placed on this statement is that Pompey I 
if he was not simply a congenital liar, was a very conf'uaed man who sought to 
conceal his uncertainty in the midst of weighty matters of stateb,y fruitless 
attempts at craftiness. In a later letter, however, Caelius speaks of soma 
remarks of Pompey I IIquae mSJdme con.f1dentiam attulerunt hominibus·49 - "which 
,ave people the greatest confidence"; these remarks were to the effect that 
se ante Kalendas Martias non posse sine iniuria de provinci1s Caesaris 
47 See above 48 and n. 1. 
4S Cicero, AQ. lam. viii.l. 
49 ~.,~. 
~ 
statuere, post Kalendas Martias se non dubitaturum. 50 
he could not with a:n:y justice decide about Cassar's provinces bef'ore the 
first of March, but that after that date he would not hesitate to act. 
The question at issue, of course, is that of allowing Caesar to stand for the 
consulship Jan. A£lm:W.! without laying down his proconsular command. Some 
months la.ter, Caeliua S\.UI1a up the situation as follows • 
. 
Pompeius, tamquam Caasarem non impugnet, sed quod illi aaquum putet con-
stituat, &it Curl.onem quaarere discordias. Valde autem non vult at plane 
timet Caesarem consulem designari prius quam exerci tum et pro'Vinoiam 
tradiderit. Accipitur satis male a Curione at totus eius secundus consu-
latus ex&gitatur.,l 
Pompey, as it he were not attacking Caesar, but making an arrangement 
which he considers fair to him, says that Curio,2 is seeking excuses for 
discQrd. .But he emphaUca.lly does not desire, and is evidently afraid of, 
Caesar's being named consul-designate before handing over his army and 
his provinoe. He is being treated harshly enough by Curio, and the whole 
of his second consulship" is being fiercely impugned. 
So, Pomp~ first appears as a dissembler, then he gives the impression of 
being forthright and straii6htforward, and than age.in he is the dissembler. The 
crux of the whole situation,' of course, as Caeliu.s indicates by his reference 
to the .second consulship, is that all of Pompey's poll tical maneuvers at tIds 
time are aimed at extrioating himself from the intolerable position in which 
he had placed himself by his blunder of allying himself with Caesar in the 
tirst plaoe. That a.lliance is & short time later referred to by Caelius as 
50 ~. 
51 ~., ll. 
5~ A tribune, supporter of Caesar. 
\1. 53 In the year 55, when Pompey and Crasaus engineered the prolonga-




"invid1osa coniunotio·S4 -- fta detestable union,· whioh now Dad bellum se 
erump1t"'S -- "is breaking out into war.· 
Caesar himself app&rently attempts to plaoe upon Pompey the onus of 
being the moving force in their fateful coalition, he speaks of their common 
enemies, "quorum ipse maxitllam part em iUo atfinitatis tempore iniunxerat Cae-
sari.,6 -- "most of whom Pompey himselr had imposed upon Caesar at the time of 
their connection. b Caesar was merely the backer and abettors !thonori et digni-
tati semper faverit adiutorque fuer1t,,'7 - "he had always supported and aided 
Pompey's influence and position." More de.finite is his charge that 
Sullam nudata omnibus rebus tribunicia potestate taman tntercessionem 
liberam. rellquisae, Pompeiu.m, qui amisss restituisse videatur, dona etiam 
quae ante habuerint ademisse. S8 
Sulla, although stripping the tribunicial power of everything, neverthe-
less left its right of intervention free, while Pompey, who bas the 
credit of having restored the privileges that were lost, took away even 
those tbat they had before. 
Espeoially bitter is Caesar over Pompey·s chameleon-like tactics in the matter 
of the candidaoy in. a'b§WA'UIJ he sa,ys that 
latura ab decem tribunis plebis • • • ut sui ratio absentia haberetur, 
ipso consuls PompeioJ qui ai improbasset, our ferri passu! asset? si pro-
basset, our se uti populi beneficio prohibuisset?59 
54 Cicero, AS. lY.. viii. 14. 
55 ~. 
56 Caesar, BellY!! C~yile i.4. 
57 l!i?;bS.. , 7. 
58 .w.s,. 















a. proposal had been carried b-J the ten tribunes, wbile Pompey himself was 
oonsul, that his candidacy should be considered in his absence ••• J if 
Pompey had disapproved, why bad he allowed the measure to be passed? if 
he had approved, why did he prevent him from taking edvantage of the 
people's kindness? 
Oaesar's derogatoIY criticism of Pompey's part in. the restoration of the power 
of the tribunes is contradicted 1r-J another contemporary, who was moreover one 
of CaeS8.1·' S own partisans, the historian Ballust. After noting that "On. POIr..-
~eio at M. Craseo consulibus tribunicia potestas restituta estB60 -- "the 
tribl.UliciaJ. power was restored in the consulsbip of Pompey and Crassu6, It he 
~kes the significant statementl 
Sed postquam On. Pompeiu8 ad bellum maritumum atque Mithrida.t1CUID masus 
est, plebis opes imminutas, paucorum potentia orevi t. 61 
When, hoy,ever, Gnaeus Pompey had been dispatched to wage war against the 
pirates &ld against Mithridates, the power of the commons was lessened, 
while that of the few increased. 
The implioation certainly is that not only had Pompey restored the privileges 
pi the people, but it was by bis actual presence, and his alone, that those 
priTlleios were maintainedl 
Velleius Patercu1us, too, gives Pompey credit for restoring the 
"ribunicial power and implicitly denies Caesar's assertion that Pompey's aotion 
~ been less beneficial than Bulla'si ItPompeius tribuniciam potestatem resti-
~uit, cuius Bulla imaginem sine re reliquerattt62 - ttPompey restored the power 
~t the tribunes" of wr.d.ch Bulla had left the shadow without the substance." 
60 Ballust, bellM Caj:.jJ.:jJtae xxxviii. 
61 Ibid., JOOC1x. 
62 Vells1us Paterculus 11.30. 
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The association of Pompey, Caesar and Crasaus in the first triumvirate is 
oharacterized by Velleius as .urbi orbique terrarum ••• ex.1tiabUis .. 6, -
nfraui~t with destruction for the city and the world,· but he confirms what 
has been suggested above,64 that Caesar oontrived to lay the burden of the 
conspiracy upon PompeYI 
Animadvertebat se cedendo Pompeii gloriae aucturum suam et tgvidia com-
munis potentiae in illum relegate. confirmaturum Yires SU&s.05 
He realized that in yielding to the prestige of Pompey he would increase 
his own and that by throwing on Pompey the odium of their joint power he 
would add to his own strength. 
Pompey's first consulship, in conjunction with Crassus, has been praised for 
the matter of the tribunicial privileges, his second, also with Crassus, was 
not so haPPYJ Caelius Rufus's remarks have already been noted,66 Velleius adds 
that the second tenure "Deque petitus honeste ab iis neque prcibabiliter gestus 
estM67 -- awas neither won by them fairly nor administered with popular 
approval." In his third consulship, in which Pompey served for the greater 
part of the year without a colleague, ftomnem Tim. in coeraitionem ambitus Ger-
cu1t,,68 -- ahe employed his whole power in curbing election abuses." Mention 
has already been made of Velleius's opinion of Pompey's treatment ot the 
6:; ~., 44. 
64 See above 65 and nn. ,6 and 57. 
6; Vellaius Paterculus ii.44. 
66 See above 64 and n. ;1. 
67 Velleius Paterculua ii.46. 




pil~at$s,69 that evidenoe of far-sighted politioal sagaoity rounds out that 
wri tert s testimony to Pompey' 8 statesmanship. 
To Seneca, the moralist ~d philosopher of the first century A. D., 
Pompey was more the politician, in the bad. sense of the word, than the states-
man) his political morality, especially in the matter of the triumTirat.e, is 
severely censured. 
Ingratus Cn. Pompeius, qui pro tribus consulatlbua, pro triumphis tribus, 
pro tot honol'ibus quos ex maxima parte imma:turus inTaaerat., hEmc gratiam 
rei publicae reddid1t. ut 111 possessionem. eius alios quoque induceret, 
quasi potentiae suae detracturus invidiam a1 quod nulli licere debebat 
pluribus licuiiu:let, dum utraordinaria concupisci t imperia, dum pro 'fin-
eias ut eli gat. distribuit, dum ita cum tertia rem publicam dividit ut 
taman in sua domo duae partes essent, eo rede,it pgpulum Romanum ut 
salvus esse non posset nisi beneficia serv1tutis.70 
Ungrateful is Gnaeus Pompey, who in return for three consulships, in 
return for three triumphs, in return for the many public offIces into 
most of which he bad thrust biaself before the legal age, showed such 
gratitude to the commonwealth that he induced others also to lay hands 
upon it - as 1£ he could render his own power less odious by giving 
several others the right to do what no man ought to haYe had the right to 
do! While he coveted extraordinary commands, while he distributed the 
provinces to suit his om ohoice, while he divided the commonwealth in 
such a way that, a.lthouah iii. third person had 8. ahare, two thirds of it 
remained in his own family,71 he reduced the Roman people to such iii. 
plight that only by the aoceptance of slav~1 were they able to survive. 
rhus, it was Pompey who initiated the alliance of the triumvirs - a Pompey, 
~reov',":', "i:Y:} abused every oonfidence placed in him to subject the Roman people 
~ his will and aalt himself to the maatery of the world. The indictment is 
Ira'Ve, but it is hardly sUl-prising coming from the pen of the confidant of a 
tf:) See above 51 and n. 9. 




The historian Taoitus, in a work that is not strictly classifiable 
as formal history, his Dialgsua, makes 8 passing reference to Pompey in a con-
nection which is pertinent to the discussion of that leader's statesmanlike 
quali ties. .Desc:dbing the earlier organization and procedure of the law courts 
the narrator is made to sayl 
Namo intra paucissimas perorare horas oogebatur et liberae comperendina-
tiones erent et modum in dicendo sibi quisque sumebat et numerus neque 
dierum neque patronorum finiebatur. Primus haec tertio consulatu Cn. Pom-
peius adstrinxit, imposuitque veluti frenos eloquentiae, ita tamen ut 
omnia in foro, omnia legibus, omnia apud praetores gererentur.7~ 
No one was obliged to complete his pleading in Ii few brief hours; post-
ponements were common; eaoh speaker determined his own limits for his 
speech; and neither the number of d~s that the trial might run nor the 
nWlber of advocates to be employed therein was fixed by law. It was 
Gnaeus Pompey who, in his third consulship, first checked these excesses 
and put Ii curb, as it were, to eloquenoe, though eve~th1ng was still 
done in court, according to law, and in the presence of magistrates. 
To the acoomplishments of Pompey's third oonsulship, therefore, must be added, 
alone with the curbing ot election abuses,73 the mucn-needed reformation of 
the law courts. 
The mucn-argued question of the authorship of the first triumVirate 
seems to be res91ved by Suetonius in favor ot Pompey, for Caesar 
omnibus officiis Gnaeum Pompeium adseotatus est • • • Pompeioque Marcum 
Crassum reconoiliavit ••• ac societatcm oum utroque iniit ne quid aeere-
tur in re publioa quod di~plicuisaet ulli e tribua.74 
b.r every possible attention oourted the good will ot anaeus Pompey 
• • • 
7~ TaCitus, Li§logu§ ~ Oratoribus xxxviii. 
73 See above 67 and n. 68. 
74 Suetonius, Vitae i.l9. 
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and reconciled Marcus eras.us wi th Pompey • • • and made a compact with 
both of them, t11&t no step should be taken in publio affairs which did 
not suit any one of the three. 
If this passage does not clearly mark Caesar as the instigator of the plot, 
at least the renewal of the agreement four years later was wholly on Caesar's 
initiative: 
Crassum Pompeiumque in urbam proYinciae suae Lucam extraotos compulit ut 
detrudendi Domitii causa consulatum alterum peterent, perfeoitque per 
utrumque ut in quinquennium sibi imperium prorogaretur. 75 
He dragged Crassus and. Pompey up to Lucca, a city in his province, where 
he prevailed upon them to stand tor & seoond consulship in order to 
defeat Domitius t and he also succeeded through their influence in having 
the term of his provincial command prolonged tor an additional five years. 
1l0rus, in his Version of the establishment ot the triumvirate, 
ta~es no sides, though he indicates that there were what may be considered 
extenuating circumstances in Pompey's case. 
Nimia Pompeii potentia apud otiosos, ut solet, cives movit invidiam. 
ketellus ob imminutum Cretae triumphum, Cato adversus potentes semper 
obliquus detrectare Pompeio aotisque eius obstrepere. Hic dolor trans-
versum egit et ad praesidia dignitati paranda impulit •••• Sic igitur 
Gaaaare dignitatem oomparare, Crasao augere, Pompeio retinere cupienti-
bus, omnibusque pariter potentiae cupidis, de invadenda re publica facile 
conveni t. 76 
'l'he exoessive power enjoyed by Pompey eXCited, as often hs,ppens, a 
f'eeline; of env.Y among the ease-loying citizens. iMietellus, because of the 
mediocrity of his Cret6ll triumph, and Cata, who always looked askance 
upon those in poweI', began to decry Pompey and clamor agunst his meas-
ures. Annoyance at this ~~ve Pompey into opposition and induced him to 
seek support for his position •••• Since Caesar, therefore, was desir-
ous ot winning, Crassus of inoreasing and Pompey of retaining prestige, 
and since all alike were e~ger I'or- l)Ower, they readily ceme to an agree-
ment to seize the government. 
7; ~., ~4. 
76 110rus ii.13. 
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but, in the matter of Caesar's oandidaoy for the oonsulship k a:pstp,jiif, 
Florus joins Caelius77 and Caesar78 in aoousing iompe.y of equivocation a 
Ut daretur oonsulatus ateenti, quem deoem tribuni favente Pomp.io nuper 
deoreverant, dissimulante eodem negabatur.79 
The granting of the consulship to Caesar in his absenoe, whioh the ten 
tX'ibunes had recently decreed with the support of Pompey, was now, 
through the machinftions of the ~flIle Pompey, refused. 
On the other band, as has already been noted,80 Florus found Pompey· s activity 
in the disposition of the piratio problem praiaewort~J the operation was 
primarily military, but its aftermath testifies to the sound stateeI'aft of the 
general, for nnee fidelior in posterum reperta gens ulla est idque prospeetum 
sin~~ari consilio duci.D8l -- -no nation was afterwards found more loyal, and 
this was secured by the remarkable foresight of the oo~der." 
A summing up of the opinions of Pompey's stateerat't and political 
activity that have been cited reveals him again as a remarkably enigmatio char .. 
acter. On the one hand, he appears to be a wise and far-sighted statesm.e.n, 
willing and able to preserve and enhance oonstitutional law and order: witness 
the ret'ormation of the law courts, the restoration of the tribunio181 power, 
the curbing of election abuses, the effective and salutary disposition of the 
piratic problem. On the other hand, he seems to be nothing more than a time-
77 See above 64 and n. ;1. 
78 See above 65-66 and n. ;9. 
79 Florus ii.l.3. 
80 See above 57 and nn. ;(.4 and ;(5. 
81 Florus 1.41. 
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serving politician, grasping for power and prestigel whether or not he was the 
master-mind of the trium.rtrate, his participa.tion therein and his operations 
arising therefrom are not to his credit, and his equivocation and vacillation 
in the matter of Caesar's second consulship is hardly exoused b,y the dilemma 
in which he then found himself. Pompey's enemies would pro'bably say that the 
latter oharaoterization of him is the true one, that his apparently statesman-
like acts were but the means to his own aggr&l1dizement and that, therefore, 
when the crisis of his affairs came, devotion to the state gave way to ward-
heeling politics. If the writer of this thesis may venture an opinion, the key 
to the problem is Caesar. A careful analysis of the political activities of 
Pompey that have been noted above will show that his failures, his errors, his 
offenses -- in short, all the facets of his political career that have been 
objects ot censure -- invariably bear 80me relation to Caesar. In conjunction 
with Caesar, whether as an a.lly or as an opponent, Pompey could do nothing 
right. Whether it was fear or awe, jealousy, anno,yance or exasperation, there 
was some irritant in all of Pompey's anociation with Caesar that brought to 
the fore a fundamental weakness of Pompey's charaoter and led him into actions 
inconsonant with the normal oonviotions ot his life. 
What thAt weakness in Pompey's cl~racter was may find some clarifica 
tion in the third and final part of this chapterJ however, at this point, 
~artly by way of digreSSion, but also as a contributing factor to Pompe.y's 
. 
Political career and a manifestation of his personality, it will be pertinent 
to consider his claim to fame as an orator. Cicero's8~ remarks on Pompey's 
-
..... 82 See aboy. J.~ Anti 1'1 lfl'7~ 
--------------------......... 
73 
oratorical ability have already been noted in Chapter II. The Judpent of 
Velleius Paterculus, on the other band, is that Pompey was "eloquentia medi-
us"63 -- "of but moderate oratorical talent." Taoitus, however, oonfirms the 
statement of Cicero; he adduces the testimony ot some ancient records, Prooe~-
~ and Letters, from which 
. 
!Atelle,i poteat Cn. Pompeiwn et Ii. CrassUlll non vir1buB modo et armis sed 
ingenio quoque et oratione valuisae.84 
it can be seen that Gneeus Pompey and ~arcus Crassu. rose to power not 
only by force of arms, but also by their talent tor oratory. 
~uetoniu8, too, furnishes some evidence tt~t oratory' was an acknowledged aCOOlD-
plishment of Pompey: 
Cn. Pompeium quidam historic! tradiderunt sub ipsum oivile bellum ••• 
repetis.e declamandi consuetudinem. 85 
Some historians have asserted. that Gnaeus Pompey resumed the practice of 
declaiming just before tbe civil war. 
Finally, the rlletorician Quintillan, whUe im;p~ini that the practice ot 
prator,y was fruailiar to Pompe~', throws an interesting light on the ciroum-
stances of that practice' 
Sunt multae a Oraecie Latinisque compositae orationes qui bus alii uteren-
tur, aci quorum conditionem vit&mque aptanda quae dicebantur !uerunt. An 
eodem modo cogi tavi taut e&ndem personam indul t Cicero cum scriberet Cn. 
Pompeio et cum T. Ampio ceterisvey86 
There are m.an.y speeohes composed by Greek and Latin authors for others to 
deliver, to wbose position and personality the words of the speeches had 
83 Velleius Paterculus ii.~9. 
84 Tao! tus, Dialo,ui :uxv1i. 
85 Sueton1us, ~ Rhetoribus i. 
06 Qulnt1lian, Institutio Oratoria ill.8.S0. 
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to be adapted. Do you suppose that Cicero's thoughts took the Bame turn 
or that he assUJD.ed the same character when he wrote for Gnaeus Pompey and 
when he wrote for Titus Alupius or the others? 
The apparent conclusion to be drawn from these few passages is that, although 
Pompey was unequal to the task of oomposing a persu&siTe speech, once the fin-
ished work was placed in his hands, he was able to deliver it with convincing 
I 
effectiveness. This ability to away an audience must have been en important I 
source of Pompey's perl30nal popularity and would seem to indicate the p08ses-
sion of certain agreeable traits of character and personality. 
A consideration of those excellences of character, as well as of the 
less pleasing aspects of Pompey's personality, will ocoupy the tinal few pages 
of this chapter. Caesar, &8 is to be expected, emphasizes the darker side of 
the picture; Pompey, he says, "neminem dignitate seaum exaequari volebatft87 --
"wanted no one to be on the same level of authority with himself." MoreoTer, 
in oonsequence of his waning prestige, Pompey nrem ad arma deduci studebatn88 
ftwas ea~er that the issue should be brought to the decision of arms." Thus, 
Pompey was so concerned for his position &nd diiUi ty that he was willa, to 
plunge the Roman world into war to maintain his supremacy; and in that war his 
Jealous spirit held as enemies all who did not actually support him, 
Pompe1us enim discedens ab urbe in senatu dixerat eodem se habiturum loco 
qui itomae reaansissent et qui in castris Caesaria fu.1ssent. 89 
for Pompey, wben quitting the city, bad said in the senate th6.t he would 
regard in the same light those who remained at Rome and those who were in 
87 Caesar, b~um Civile i.4. 
88 ,lli,g. 




The historian Velleiu5 Paterculus had, as has a,lrea.dy been pointed 
out in the first part of this chapter,90 the greatest admiration for Pompey, 
and tbe "few words n91 to which he proposed to limit his discussion of the 
general run on at some length. 1'hey begin with a sUIIUllary of Pompey' s appear-
ance, personality and morality and the chief characteristics of his public 
life' 
Fait hic ,enitus matre Lucilia stirpis sanatoriae, forma excellens, non 
ea qua flos comwendatur aetatls, sed ea dignitate constantiaque quae in 
illam conveniens amplitudinem fortunamque eum ad ultimum vitae comitata 
est diem; innocentia exim1us, sanctitate praecipuus, eloquentia medius, 
potentiae quae honoris causa ad eum deferretur, non vi ab eo occuparetur, 
cupidissimus, dux bello peritiS8imus, civis in toga, nisi ubi vereretur 
ne quem haberet par&m, modestissimus, amicitiarum tenax, in offensis 
exorabilis, in reconoilianda gratia fideliasimus, in aooipiende satisfao-
tione facillimus, potentia sua. numquam aut raro ad impotentiam usus, 
paene omnium vi tiorum expers, nisi numeraretur inter maxima in ci '9'i tate 
libera dominaque ientium indi~nari, cum omnes cives iure haberet pares, 
quemquam aequalem digni tate conspicere. 9~ .1 
On the side of lus mother Lucilia he was of senatorial stock. He was dis-
tinguished by a personal'beauty, not of the sort wldch gives the bloom of 
youth its charm, but stately and unohanging, well befitting his impor ... 
tance and good fortune and attending him. to the last day of his Ufe. Of 
exceptionally great purity of life, of great uprightness of oharacter, of 
but moderate oratorical talent, he was ambitious of such power as might 
be conferred upon him as a mark of honor but not that which he might for-
cibly usurp. In war a resourceful general, in peace a citizen of temperstt 
conduct except when he feared a rival, constant in his friendships, easilJ ['II 
placated when offended, loyal in re-establishing terms of amity, very 
ready to accept satisfa.ction, rarely or never abu.in, his power, he was ,I 
free from almo.t every fault, unless it be considered one of the greatest 
faults for a man to chafe at saeins a1'l¥one his equal in dignity in a free 
state that was the mistress of the world, where he should justly regard 
90 See above ;0 and n. 4. 
91 ~. 
92 Velleius PaterculUB ii.2Q 
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all. citizens as his eG.u~s. 
Remarkable as this eulogy 1s, it cannot avoid mentioning - and not onee, but 
twice - the jealous regard Pompey had for his own prestige. To Vel1e11.1s, con-
sidering the circumstances of Pompey's rise to glor,y, such a selfish pride is 
a source of wonderment. Pompey had enjoyed the honor of two triumphs before 
becoming consul and while still merely' an agues, yet 
quem virum quis non lIliretur per tot extraordinaria imperis. in SUIIWlUID fas-
tigium evectum iniquo tulisse animo C. Caesaris absentia in altero oonsu-
latu petendo senatum populumque Roaanum ration em haberel adeo familiare 
est hominibus omnia sibi ignoscere, nihil alils rem1ttere.93 
who is there who does not feel surprise that trds man, who owed his eleva 
tion to the highest position in the state to so many extraordinary com-
mands, should have taken it ill that the senate and the Roman people were 
wiUiug to consider Galus Caesar as a candidate for the consulship a 
second time, though suing for 1t in absence? 80 common a failing it 1s 
for men to overlook ever,y irregular1ty in their own case, but to make no 
conoessions to others. 
Velleius hints also that Pompey's seeking for power and glory was not unaccom-
panied by intrigue. When the question arose of giving Pompey the command 
liB-inst .ilti.i thridates in place of Lucius Lucullus, the author of the bill propos-
ing the change was "Jilanilius, tribunus plebis, semper venalls et alienae 
lIinister potentie.e,,94 - "the tribune Manilius, a man of venal character alwayf 
and ready to abet the ambitions of others." The law was passed, and Lucullus 
then accused Pompey of too grea.t ubi tion; the charge was not unfounded, says 
VeUeius Paterculua, 
nam neque Pompeius, ut primum a.d rem publicam 4iires~us est; quemquam 
omnino parem tulit, et in quibus rebus primus esse debebat, solus esse 
93 Ibid., )0. 
94 l.b,iQ., J). 
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cupiebat. Jeque eo viro quisquam aut alia omnia minus aut gloriam magis 
concupilt: in appetentibus honorlbus lmmodicus, in gerendis Yerecundissi-
mus, ut qui eos ut libentissime in1ret, ita finiret aequo animo, et quod 
aupisaet arbitrio suo sumeret alieno deponeret.9S 
for Pompey, trom the time when he tirst took part in public lite, could 
not brook an equal at all; in undertakings in which he should have been 
merely the first, he wished to be the only one. In fact, no one desired 
other things less or glory more than he: yet, though unrestrEdned in his 
quest for position, he eXercised his authority with the utmost moderation. 
80 that, however eagerly he ente~eu upon ottice, he would retire there-
from wi tl1 unconcern, and, though he followed his own inclinations in 
grasping at what he wanted, he would yield it up again at the wish ot 
another. 
His disdain ot everything but personal ilory is illustrated by his attitude 
toward the wealth which fell into his hands during his military campaigns} he 
lIliiSht have appropriated vast sums to swell his own tortune, yet, to cite an 
example, he levied upon Tigranes a fine of 
ingenti pecunia, q'U&e omois, sicuti Pompeio moris erat, redacta in quaes-
toris potestatem sc publicis descripta litteris.96 
a h~e sum of money, all of which, as was Pompey's practioe, was turned 
over to the quaestor and listed in the public accounts. 
Pompey' 8 unwillingness that anyone should be his equal finds an echo 
~so in Seneca; that tact, he says, had early become apparent to Caesar. 
In oculis erat iam (''n. Pompeiu8 non aequo laturu$ animo quemqU8ffi alium 
esse in re publica magnum et modum impositurua incrementis, quae gruvi~ 
1lli videbantur, etiam cum. in commune crescerent.97 
It was already plain to his eyes tllat Gnaeua IJompey would not endure with 
oalmness that any other should become great in the commonwealth and that 
he would place a Chf;ck upon Oaesar's advancement, which seemed to be 
annoying to Pompey even when it was increasing to their oommon interest. 
9; 12id. 
96 Ibid., 37. 
97 Seneca,Dialo~i Yi.14. 
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~n fact, his striving for supremacy was the motivation of Pompey's whole 
career: 
Ie Gnaeo quidem Pompeio externa bella ao domestica virtuB aut retio sua-
debat, sed insanus &mOl' magnitudinis faleae. Modo in Hispaniam et Serto-
riana arma, modo ad colUgandos piratas ac maria pacanda vadebat. Rae 
praetexebantur causae ad continuandam potentiam. Quid illum in Atrioam, 
quid in septentrionem, quid in Mi thridaten et Armeniam et omnia Asiae 
angulos traxit? Infinita scilioet oupido crescendi, cum sibi uni parum 
magnus videretur.98 ~ 
rt was not virtue or reason which impelled Gnaeus Pompey to foreign and 
domestic warsJ no, it was his mad passion for the appearance of greatness. 
Now he attacked Spain and the faction of Sartorius} now he fared forth to 
enchain the pirates and subdue the seas. These were merely excuses and 
pretexts for extending his power. What drew him into Africa, into the 
North, against Mit}~idates, into Armenia and all the corners of Asia? 
Assuredly., it was his boundless desire to grow bigger; only in his own 
eyes was he not great enough. 
iA.nother facet of Pompey's character, wl'.ich is a reflection of his craving for 
public adulation and was deemed wortbY of censure by Seneca, is hie love of 
pomp and display, as manifested b.1 the exhibition of elephant-fighting which 
Hum et Pompeium primum in circo elephantorum duodeviginti pusnam edidisae 
commissis more proel1i noxiis hominibus ad ullam rem bonam pertinet? 
Princeps civitatis et inter antiquos principes, ut f~ tradidit, bonita-
tis ex1miae memorabile putavit epectaculi genus novo more perdere homines • 
•• • 0 quantum caliginis ment.ibus nostris obioit magna felioit&sl Ille 
se supra rerum nature esse tunc credid1t.99 
Now, does it serve any useful purpose to know that POllipey was the first to 
exhibit in the circus a contest of eighteen elephants engaged in mimic 
battle with oriminals? He, a l€Jader of the state and one who, according 
to report, was conspiouous among the leaders of old for the kindness of 
his heart, thought it a notable kind of spectacle to kill h~ beings 
after So new fashion. • • • Oh, what blindness great prosper-ity oasts upon 
98 Seneca, *Rb'!ulle Mpralel xCiv.64-65. 
99 Seneca, DiaJ.2G x.l). 
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our mindsl lie believed at that timelOO that he was beyond the power of 
nature. 
That Pompey was the first, beweTer, to exhibit elephants in battle in the 
circus is contradicted b.Y the eld~r Pliny,lOl who instances two previous 
o00urrences of the kind, the first as early as 99 B. C.J the originality of 
Pompey's display l~" in the great num,ber of animals involved. but, at least, 
" PlinylO~ assigns to Pompey the distinction of being the first to employ ele-
phants to draw the chariot of state in a triumphal proce8~ionJ the occasion 
was the triumph for Atrica, but the attempt proved a boomerang, . for the beast13 
were unable to pass through the city gates.IO' To return to the passage of 
Seneca Just oi ted, it is to be noted that the mention of Pompey's 'boni tatis 
eximiae ft is particularly significant in view of the tenor of the passage as a 
whole; the implied s1lgl£estion that such extrovert-like actions were alien to 
his true chara.cter is supported by another statement of Seneca. "Bihil erat 
mollius ore PompeiiJ numquam non coram pluribus rubuit, utique in contioni-
Cue·104 -- ·Pompey had the most sensitive cast of countenance, he always 
blUShed in the p£es6nce of a gathering, and especially at public assemblies." 
Bashfulness is hardly lW. attribute of the swashbuekler. 
Seneca's nephew, Luoan, echoes his uncle's sentiment that Pompe,y 
100 The spectaole occurred in 55 B. C., during Pompey's second oon-
lulship. 
lO~ lltiS.., .c:. 






could not endure that ~one else should approaoh him in greatness: 
Nec quemquam iam terre potest Caesarve priorem 
Pompeiusve parem.10S 
No longer could Caesar a greater endure, 
Nor Pompey an equal. 
80 
<Tet, later in his work, Luoan presents a oharacter sketoh of Pompey that is all 
but entirely a song of praise. The sen~imenta expressed are not represented as 
uucan's om, but as those of Oato Utioensis, who, although he had been a bitter 
ppponent of much of Pompey's policy, suppol~ted him in the civil war and becwne 
~ha leader of the fight against Caesar after Pompey's death. It may be sur-
nissd, however, from the opening lines of the passage, that the supposed enco-
i!durn of Cato is LUCM' s own tribute to the greatness of Pompey. 
Pauoa Catonia 
Verba, sed Ii pleno venientia pectore veri. 
'Cins obit, t 1nquit, 'multum maioribus impar 
Nosse modum iuria, sed in hoc taman utilis aevo, 
Cui non ulla fuit iusti reverentia,; salva 
Lihertate patens at salus plebe parata 
Pri vatus servire sibi rectorque senatus, 
Sed regnantis, erat. Nil belli iure poposcit, 
Quaeque dari voluit, volult sibi posse negari. 
Immodicas possedit opes, sed plura retentis 
Intulit. Invasit ferrum, sed ponere norat. 
Praetul1t anna togae, sed. pacem armatus 8.I!lS.vitJ 
Iuvi t sumpta ducem, iuv! t dimissa potestas. 
Casta domus luxuque carena corruptaque numquam 
Fortuna domini. Clarum €lit venerabile nomen 
Gentibus, at multum nostrae quod proderat urbi.,106 
Few were the words of Cato, but thEr,f came from a heart fraught with truth. 
fA citizen hae departed,' said he, 'who was far inferior to our ancestors 
in recognizing the lim! ts of what is lawful, but was yet valuable in ttds 
agi::: of ours wldco. has shown no respect for justice. He was powerful with-
105 Luoan i.125-126. 
- 106 Ibid... ixnlg8-20~, 
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out destroying freedoll; he alone, when the people were ready to do his 
bidding, remained in private station; he ruled the senate, but it was a 
senate ot kinas. He made no claims by right ot war; what he wished to 
receive, he wished that others should have the power to refuse him. He 
acquired great wealth; but he paid into the treasury more than he kept 
baok. He seized the sword; but he knew how to lay it down. He preterred 
war to peace; but he was a lover ot peace even when he wielded the weap-
ons of war. rt pleased him to assume the power of a prince, it pleased 
him also to resign it. His household was pure and tree troll. extravagance 
and never spoiled by the greatness of its master. His name is illustrious 
and revered among the nations, ana great was his service to our own land.' 
There is little in these words that calls for elaboration; similar in tone to 
the eulogy of Velleius Paterculus,l07 they are simple and forthright and point 
put Pompey's excellences and palliate his faults in such a way as to be almost 
a contradiction of the author's pI'enous assertion ot Pompey's passion tor 
~up.l'emacy • 
That passion for supremacy is mentioned also by 11orus: 
lam Pompeio 5uspectae Caesaris opes et Oaesari Pompei ana dignitaa gravis; 
nec ille ferebat pa.rem nee hie superiorem.108 
Caesar.s strength was now an object of suspicion to Pompey, and Pompey's 
eminence was otfens! ve to' Caesar, Pompey could not brook an equal or 
Caesar a superior. 
~ comparison of this statement of Florus with the simUar statements of Lucan 
~d Velleiua Paterculus reveals t;. remarkable unanimity. all three express the 
IiWile thought with the same verb and the same adjective. Florus says Bnec ille 
'erebat parem"; Lucan'sl09 words are "nee quemquam ism terre poteat 
• • • 
107 See above 75-76 and n. 9~. 
lOB Florua ii.13. 
109 See above 80 and n. 105. 
-
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<It ~arem"; and Vel1eius110 puts it Itneque ••• quemquam oumino parem tullt." The 
, 
~ost verbatim agreement of these authors suggests a cliche, as if the phrase 
Iwere a sta:ndard characterization of Pompey, somewhat after the manner of the 
so-called "Homeric epithets. ltllOa But, whether or not the expression was one 
of those too-pat proverbial bal.f'-truths, it is in tull tl..greement with a great 
portion of the other testimony to Pompey's character: the prinoipal, and 
~ost the only, charge leveled at him by the authors cited in this section of 
~he thesis is his w.oounded ubi tion for undisputed and una bared grea. mess. 
Apart from this eagerness for prestige and glor,y, however, almost 
all the other aspects of Pompey's character and personality are deemed wortt~ 
pi praise. Both as a private citizen and in his public life, his integrity, 
pis moderation, bis generous nature, his geniality and dfability were appar-
mtly of such an attractiveness that, in spite of the seriousness of his 
raul ts, he was able t(.) win and hold friends and maintain hl.JBseU, even in the 
~ier phases of his career, in a perennial popularity. 80 high was the esteem 
n winch he was held that his passing was regretted even by his enemieSI after 
US death at the hands of the kin~ of Egypt, his head was sent to Caesar, ftquo 
ru>nspeoto Ca.esar etiam lacri.mas fudisse dicitur tanti viri intuens caputd1l -
110 See above 76-77 and n. 95. 
110a Or they may have merely copied from one another, Lucan from 
'elleius, and Florus from either Velleius or Lucan. There is aleo the possi-
tlUity that the three all drew from a common source, which could well have been 
~he lost books of LiVYI there are grounds for believing that Lucan relied 
1168.1'117 upon L1vy, and Florus himself claims that his own work is an epitome 
t Livy. And if .i'lorua and Lucan, why not Velleius Paterculus? 
III Eutropius ~.21. 
8,3 
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"at the sight of wr~ch even Caesar is said to have shed tears as he looked 
upon the head of so great a man." 
CRAPT1R IV 
CONCLUSION 
In the two preceding chapters, which constitute the main body of 
there has been presented the evidence of Cicero's letters and of 
Dumber of other ancient wri tinge for the determination of the character and 
tlaI·&!Ol:1C1.1 ..... ty of Pompey the Great. It is the function of this chapter, in aCCOT"O'" 
wi th the plan outlined at the end of Chapter I, to sum up briefly the 
............ t points that have been developed in Chapters II and III ana to attempt 
reconcile the varying opinions expressed therein. The reader will have 
observed that a formidable obstaole stands in the way of a oomplete 
thesiS, in that not all of the writers cited touoh upon all the phases and 
of Pompey' IS career; the peculiar interests of the nrious wi ters and 
purpose and soope of their works have led eaoh to state facts and express 
which must be taken into oonsideration in any discussion of the char-
of Pompey but which, in the absence of related facts and judgments, do 
present a complete pioture of the whole life of the men. This circumstance 
especially notewortby in the oase of Cicerol the letters almost oompletely 
Pompe-yf £I mill tary capacity until Cicero t s own fears at the beginning of 
civil war focused his attention in that direotion; moreover, his portrayal 
Pompey is incomplete for another reason, the pauoity of extant letters for 




A similar variation of emphasis and a similar insufficiency of data for 
specific phases of Pompey's career is noted alao in various of the other 
writers cited. The result is that, for many aspects of Pompey's life, the body 
of evidence is inadequate for arriving at sound and incontrovertible judgments} 
at times, in fact, the testimony of a single author is the only basis for 
forming any judgment at all. 
The first of the three aspects under which Pompey is being studied 
in this thesis, namely, his military oaree1', may be most advantageously pre-
santed, tbis writer belieTes, by marshaling the evidence in the ohronologicaJ. 
rdar of the events disousaed. On this basis, tl~ first reference to Pompey's 
itar,y activity is the statement of Velleius Pateroulusl that from early 
hood he bad been closely associated with a sagacious commander, his father, 
d that his capacity to learn was remarkable for !In exceptional insight into 
itar,y tactics. Presently, according to Eutroplus,2 he was commanding for 
ulla, with a rank second only to that general himself, and he so distin-
. shed himself that he won the honor of a triumph - notwithstanding his 
trame youth and the faot that he had as yet beld no public office. Some fiTe 
r six years later, Pompey was sent into Spain to join Metellus in putting 
1m the insurrection of Sartorius. The two authors who mention this oampaign 
re not in entire agreement as to the pre-eminenoe of Pompey's part therein. 
elleius Paterculus3 asserts that, altllough Sertorius gave greater praise to 
1 See ahoTEI SO and nne S-7. 
2. See ahove 59 and nne 32 and 33. 




MetsUus, it was P.ompfW.1 whom he feared the more; Eutropius,4 while not denying 
[Velleius's statement, asoribes Sartorius's d.ownfall prino1pally to the faot 
that he was opp.osed by two generals instead .of one and states simply and 
impa.rtieJ.ly that the war was brought to an end by Gnaeus Pompey and Quintus 
tJietellus. Pompey himself, aoo.ording to an alleged letter .of his reoorded in 
Sallust's miStoriag. &pPMrS to lay olaim to the whole sucoess of the Serto-
'l'ian oampaign. ·Hae 11 tterae • • • rec1 tatae in senatunS - "this letter was 
read in the senate, J1 says Sallust, thus asoribing ta 1 t the authentioi ty of a 
Ireoorded d.ooument. Its style, however, is somewhat at variance with that .of 
several other letters ot Pompey f.ound among the correspondenoe of Cicerol the 
"",atter, being for the most put military dispatohes, art'! genera.l.ly short, 
~1mple and teree, this 1s fairly l.ong and more in the nature .of a speeoh tha.n 
~f a letter. It begins, for example, with a flourish ot rhetorio. 
Si advorsus voe patriamque et deos penatis tot labores et perioula Susoe-
pissem, quotiens a prima. adulescentia duotu meo eoelestissumi hostes tuei 
at vobis suus quaesi ta est, nibil ampUus in absentem me statuissetis 
qU8Jll adhuo agitis, patres oonsol"ipti, quem oontra aetatem proiectum ad 
bellum se.evissumum oum exercitu optume merita, quantum est in vobis, fame, 
miserruma omniwn morte, confeoistis. Haoins spe populus Romanus liberos 
suosoo bellum mis1t? Haec sunt praemia pro volneribus et toties ob rem 
publicam tuBo sangutne16 
If I had been warring against you, against my country and against my 
fathers' gods, when I endured suoh hardsbips and dangers as those amid 
whioh trom my early youth the armies under my oommand have routed the 
most or1m.inal ot your enemies and insured your safety, eYen then, Fathers 
of the Senate, you could haYe done no more against me in my absence than 
you are now doing. For, after having exposed me, in spite of my youth, to 
4 See above 59-60 and nn. 34 and 35. 
5 Sallust, i:li§toriM 11.98. 
6 IJrul. 
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a most cruel war, you bave, so far as in you lay, destroyed me and a 
faithfUl army b,y starvation, the most wretched of all deaths. Was it with 
such expectations that the Roman people sent its sons to war? Are these 
the rewards for wounds and tor SO often shedding our blood for our coun-
try? 
19hether the letter was actually written by Pompey in its present torm or 
~hether it is a reconstruction b,y Sallust trom hearsay, it probably reflects 
l'ompey'iS frame of mind of the moment; he complains that tor three years he has 
peen waSing a war with inadequate resources, that he ba. used up his own 
per80nal wealth, that even his credit is now exhausted, th~t, unless the 
~enate provides funds and supplies, he will not be able to prevent the enemy 
Prom marchins into Italy and that, thus, he himself will have no alterns.tive 
but to withdraw into Italy, bringing with him the whole Spanish war. And, to 
support his complaints and demands .. he points out what he has already accom-
plished. 
Equidem fateor me ad hoo bellum maiore studio quam consilio profectum, 
quippe qui nomine modo imperii a vobis aceepto diebus quadrasinta exer-
citum paravi hostisque in cervicibws iam Italiae &geatis ab Alpibus in 
Hispaniem sumDI.OviJ per eu iter aliud atque Hannibal, nobis opportunius, 
pateteci. Recepi Galli .. , Pyrenaeum, Lacetsniam, Indigetis et primwn 
impetum Sertorii nctoris novis mill tibus at multo paucioribu.s sustinui.7 
r admit that I entered upon this war with more zeal. than discretion, for, 
within forty days of the time when I received from you the empty title ot 
commander, I had raised and equipped an army and driven the enemy, who 
were already at the throat ot Italy, from the Alps into Spain; and over 
those mountains I opened for you another and wore convenient route than 
Hannibal had taken. I recovered Gaul, the Pyrenees, Lacetania .. the Indi-
~etes; and with raw soldiers and far interior number' I withstood the 
first onslaught of a triumphant Sertorius. 




Cllioian pirates. The task was accomplished, says Eutropius,8 with smazing 
speed within the space of a few months, Florus,9 too, marvels at the swiftness 
of the C8JIlpaign and emphasizes its la.sting effeot, which was principall.y due 
to Pompey's wi.dOll in establishing the survivors in inland agricultural pur-
suits, this prudent move is also praised by Vellei118 Paterculus,lO in that the 
Cilicians were thus restrained from piracy b,y the removal of the necessity 
thereof. Immediately after the suppreSSion of the pirates and while Pompey was 
still absent from Italy, a law was passed gj.Y1ng him command of the war 
against llUthridates. In this oampaign, which kept him away from Rome for the 
next four years, Pompey reaohed the pinn.aole of his milltary fame, to judge 
from the amount of spaoe the various authors devote to it and the nature of 
the praises they bestow upon it. The conuuents of Velleius Pateroulu5,ll 
t Florus12 and Lutropiue,13 whioh have been disoussed with sufficient tulness in 
! 
Chapter III not to need repetition here, are indicative of the outstanding 
quality of this phase of Pompey's generalship, the only dissenting volce is 
that of Cassa.r, a.s reoorded by Suetonius.14 The Mlthridatic campaign is also 
the oooasion for Cicerols first DleD.tion in his letters of Pompeyls m1lltary 
S See above &:J and n. 36. 
9 See above 57 and nn. 24 and 2;. 
10 See above 51 and n. 9. 
11 See above ;2 and rm. 10 and 11. 
12 See above ',..56 and nn. 19-22.. 
13 See above 60 and nn. 37-41. 
14 See above '3-;4 and n. 14. 
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career, at the close of the campaign he celled him greater than A.frlcSllus1, 
and, although the sincerity of the phrase may be somewhat discounted, inas-
much as it was addressed to Pompey himself, yet, to another correspondent a 
.f'ew years later, Cicero speaks of Pompey's "most brilliant achievements ... 16 
When they come to the discussion of the civil war, the tone of 
. 
Cicero and the other writers is generally one of disappointment and oensure. 
Pompey's aotivity in that war falls rougbly into three phases, his early 
maneuvering in Italy, his orossing of the Adriatic and the subsequent opera-
tions on the Illyrian coast, and the final battle in Thessa.ly. The principal 
charges against Pompey in the first phase are made by Cicero, although he had 
said at the very beginning that careful preparations were being made on the 
initiative of Pompey,17 the following letters are of an entirely different 
tenor; all Pompey's proceedings are fatuous and rash,18 he has no spirit, no 
.J plan, no ener&y ,19 he bas made not one prudent or courageous move,20 he is 
foolhardy, listless, careless,a he bas committed one blunder after another,22 
15 See above 15 and n. 4. 
16 See above 15 and n. 5. 
17 See above 15 and n. 6. 
18 See abo.,e 16 and n. 7. 
19 See abo.,e 16 and n. 9. 
20 See aboTe 18-19 and n. 15. 
~ See above 21 and n. 22. 







be is the worst of generals.:2,3 With tbis indictment Caelius Rurus agrees, 
calling Pompey a helpless trifler who is doing nothing but stir up oonfusion.~ 
The speoific causes of Cicero's annoyanoe are Pompey's abandonment of Rome,2, 
his failure to relieve Dom tius at Corf'inium,26 and his withdrawal from 
ltru.y.27 The withdrawal fl'om Italy i5 also censured by Florus28 as a disgraoe-
ful flight. fortunately for a better understandine of Pompey' $I act! vi ties 
during these early days of the war, there exist some h&lf-dozen letters of his 
among Cioerots letters to Att1cusJ these letters of Pompey present the state 
of the war from his point of view and show some reason fOl' the apparent uncel"-
tainty of his operations and espeoialJ..y :f'or his attitude in the matter of the 
relief of Corfinium. In a message of' the early part of February, 49, he tells 
010ero that he bas been informed that 
L. Dom! tium oum suis cohortibus XII at cum c.ohortibus XIV quas VibuUius 
adduxit ad me iter habere; habuisse in animo profieisci Corfinio a. d. V 
Id. lebr.29 
Lucius Domi tius with his twa1 ve cohorts and the fourteen brought by 
Vibullius is on the way to me; he intended to leave Corf'inium on Febru-
ary 9. 
A few days later, on learning that Domitius bas ohanged his plene, Pompey 
23 See above 2l and n. 21. 
24- See above 48 and n. 1. 
25 See a.bove 16-19 and nn. 9, 1..<. and 15. 
26 See above 19-20 and nn. 16, 17 and 19. 
27 See above 19-21 and nne 16 and 20. 
2$ See above 57 and n. 27. 





writes to the latter. 
Nos disiecta manu pares adversario esse non possumus; contractis nostris 
capita spero nos at rei publicae et communi saluti prodesse posse. Quam 
ab rem, cum constituissea ••• Corfinio proficisci cum exercitu et ad me 
venire, miror quid causae fuerit qua re conaillwn mutaria •••• Quanto 
enim magis appropinquare adversariua ooepit, eo tibi oelerius agendum 
erat ut te mecum coniungeres, prius quam Caesar aut tuum iter impedlre 
aut me aba te exoludere posset. Quam ob rem, eUo atQ.ue etia te rogo et 
hortor, id quod non desUti superioribus litteris a te petere, ut primo 
quoque die Luceriam advenires, ante quam copiae quas !nat! tui t Caesar 
contrahere in unum locum coactae vas a nobis distrahant.30 
With divided forces we cannot cope with the enemy, united, I trust we may 
be able to do something for the state and the common weaJ.. Wherefore, 
sinoe you had deoided • • • to set out from Corfinium with your army and 
oome to me, r wonder what reason there has been for your change of plan • 
• • • The nearer our enemy begins to approach, the more quickly you ought 
to have joined foroes with me, before Caesar could obstruct your maroh or 
out me off from you. Therefore, &ial.n and again I entreat and exhort you 
- as I did not fail to do in my previous letter - to come to Luceria On 
the first possible day, before the forces which Caesar has begun to 
collect can concentrate in one spot and divide us. 
There immediately followed upon this letter another of the same tenorl Domi-
tiuB is again warned of the danger of a division of forces and is again urged 
to repair to Pompey at the first opportuni tYI the letter continues. 
Nolita commoveri si audieris me regred1, si torte Caesar ad me Teniet, 
cavendum enim puto esse ne implicatus baeream. Nam ueque castra propter 
ann1 tempus et D1illtum animos f'acere possum neque ex omnibus oppidis 
contrahere oopias ~ed1t, ne reoeptum amittam.3l ' 
Do not be disturbed if you hear of my retreat in the face ot Caesar's 
possible advance, for I oonsider that I must take every step to avoid 
being caught in a trap. 'l'he seaaon or the year and the spirit of rq 
troops prevent me from making a campJ nor 1s 1t wise to call up the 
troops from all the towns, lest my retreat be cut off. 
And the letter conoludes with this significant statement. 
,30 ~., Ub. 
31 .!..W.., 12c. 
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Quod me hortare ut istuc veniam, id me facere non arbitror posse, quod 
non magno opere his legionibus confido • .32 
I fear I cannot comply with your request that I come to your assistance, 
because I do not put much trust in these legions. 
In still a tidrd letter to Domitius, Pompey says WI told you sows Dom1tius is 
being hemmed in b.y Caesar and will have great difficulty now in extricating 
himself and making his way to Pompey;3.3 The importance of the letter, however, 
lies in the further mention of the poor quality of Pompey's troops: he refers 
" 
to "his legionibus de quarum voluntate dubitamus".34 -- -these legions whose 
loyalty is ~uestionableft, and he asserts, 
Neque enim meorum m!litum, quos mecum habeo, voluntate satis confido ut 
de omnibus 1'0rtunis rei publicae dimiCE?.m • .3S 
I cannot place sufficient confidence in the loyalty of the men I have 
with me to risk a decisive engagement. 
1'hese three letters to Dom! tius are followed h'.r one to the consuls Marcellus 
and Lentulus, in which Pompey further defends his actions and points out his 
reasons for his contemplated withdrawal to Brundisiuml 
Ad L. Dom1tium. lltteras misi, primum uti ipse cum omui copia ad nos 
veniretJ ai de se dubitaret, ut cohortea III quae ex Piceno ad me iter 
habeoont ad nos m! tteret. Quod veri tus sum factum est, ut Dom! tius impli-
caretur •••• Nunc scitote me esse in summa sollicitudine" Nam et tot et 
tales viros periculo obsidionis !ibarare oupio neque subsidio ire possum, 
quod his duabus legionibus non puto esse commi tten.dum ut illuc ducantur. 
• • • Nunc, cum hoc tempore nihilo magis ego quam VOl subs1d1o Dom! tio 
ire ,ossim, • • • non est nobis commi ttendum ut ad has lli oooortes quas 
dubio animo babeo hostis aceedere aut in itinere me oonsequi possit. ~uam 
32 Ibid. 





ob rem, plac! tum est mihi • • • ut brundisium ducerem llanc copie.m quam 
meoum habeo • .36 
I sent a dispatch to Lucius Domitius to come to me at once with his whole 
torce J if he were doubtful abou.t himself, he was to send. me the nineteen 
cohorts which, as it happened, were on the way to me from Picenum. It 
turned out as I teared. Domitius is trapped •••• Iou must realise that 
I am in the greatest anxiety, for I am eager to tree so many excellent 
~en from the hazards of a siege, and yet r cannot go to their assistance, 
because I do not think that I 0&11 trust these two legions to march 
thither. • •• Bo., since at the present time I am no more able than you 
to go to the relief of Domitius, ••• I must not allow the enemy to meet 
these fourteen wavering cohorts ot Mine or overtake me on the march. 
Therefore, • • • I have determined to lead my present force to Brundisium. 
~ompey thus lays the blame for the debacle at Cortinium on the stubbornness 
~~d short-sightedness of Domitius and ofters a plausible excuse for his 
failure to assist Domitius and for all his Fabian tactics in Italy in the 
paucity and uncertain loyalty of his troops. After he bad successfully with-
drawn his forces from a beleaguered hrundisium and crossed over into Illyria, 
Pompey continued his dilatory tactics;J7 his forces were still small and of 
poor quality, Cicero'J8 admits, but, when he was forced into an engagement at 
OyrrhachiWll, he came off victorious. Although, apparently still doubtful of 
his troops, he failed to follow up this success immediately and thus incurred 
Caesar's scorn,J9 he presently be&an to bave confidenoe in his troops40 and 
.36 .IeW.., l;l;a. 
37 See above 58 and n. ~. 
38 See above 22 and n. ,,5. 
.39 See above S4 and n. 15, and 61 and n. ~. 
40 See above " and n. ~6. 
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'" 1mpulsiYoly rushed off after Caesar in spite of all adYice to the oontrary,41 
~eini goaded into aotion by the importunity ot the more irresponsible of his 
~ubordinates.~ ~ the time Pompey arrived in Thessaly and was ready to risk a 
~ecisive engagement, he had assembled a formidable array that far outnumbered 
Jaesar's forcesJ43 yet, in the final battle at Pharsalia, he was ignominiously 
iefeated. Two reasons are given by Cioero for Pompey's disastrous end: the 
~espur of his oause that had taken possession ot the minds of his followers44 
and, more proximately, the faot that With raw and hastily leYied troops he had 
tsiven battle to the touahest legions.45 With Cicero's thus more than once 
~iving the lie to his h¥sterical recriminations at the start of the war and 
with Pompey's om exposition of the awkward situation in which he found hi»-
~elf, the overall picture of bis generalship, even in its final stages, 
appears worthy ot the fame that has been attached to it. In fact, in view of 
Pompey's advancing years (he was fifty-eight) end the poor state of his 
p.ealtb46 and considering the inferior quality of his troops, the desperation 
~o wbioh he was driven by & supercilious and importunate nobllity and the fact 
uhat he was fightins for a lost cause, it is this writer's opinion that Pompey 
iisplayed his greatest qualities in his last oampaign. Despite the handioaps 
41 See above 5~-S3 and n. 13. 
42 See above 5a and n. ~. 
43 See above 48-49 anG lUh ~ and 3, and 61 and n. 44. 
44 See above 21 and n. ~. 
45 See above " and 11. ,,7. 
46 See aboy. 18 and n. 13. 
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under which he labored, he came wit.hin an ace of crushini Caesar at. Dyrrha-
onium, and at Pharsalia t.he t.urn of t.he die was of the slight.est. bet.ween 
viotory and rout. 
Pompey's polit.ical oareer may also be oonsidered in a more or less 
chronological order. The first referenoes are to his first. oonsulship in 70 
.b. C., in which he is iiven oredit' by Sallust,47 and Yelleius Paterculus.4B ot 
having restored the power of the tribunes that had been abridged by Sulla, 
alt.hough Caesar49 assert.s t.hat Pompeyls aotion, while seemjngly to t.he publio 
advant.age, was even more delet.erious than Sulla's. There is no furt.her mention 
of Pompey's poli t.ical aoti vi ty until aft.er his return to Rome at the end of 
the year 6;( trom his campaigns in the east, during his absence, however, he 
had &iyen evidenoe ot sound stateoratt in his Judicious sett.lement of the 
piratio problem. 50 Ihen he returns to t.he oity, his att.it.ude is puzzling and 
annoying t.o Cioero. Pompey appears to haYe no polit.ioal. moralit.y"l his publio 
utteranoes are va.pe, patronizing and ineffeotual,,2 bribery and int.rigue 
feature his support of unpopular oandidates and laws,'3 he preters to sulk in 
triumphal dignit.y rather than exercise the statesmanship of whioh he is 
47 See a1x>ve 66 and n. W. 
48 See aboTe 66 and n. 62. 
49 See above 65 and 11. 58. 
,0 See above 67-68 and n. 69, and 71 and un. 80 and 81. 
52 See above 24-25 and un. 31 and 32. 
S:; See aboTe 25-26 and no. 33 and 36. 
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oapable. 54 Presently he enters into a coalition with Caesar and Crassus, and 
Oicero caricatures him as an oriental despot.;S 
Pompey's participation in that detestable union;6 which was to prove 
ruinous to the city and the world;7 meets with universal condemnation. Cicero'. 
~ritioism is probably the most severe. the triumvirate is a despotism'S and 
iibe triumvirs are three unscru.pulo~ men;9 of unbelievable treachery60 whose 
perniCious aots61. must end in a reign of terror; 62 and Pompey himselt is 
aiming at ld.ngly power. 63 Although this last statement would seem to indicate 
that Cicero considered Pompey to be the motivating force behind the coalition, 
where are other passages which give the impression, in a negative sort of way, 
liO be aure, that it was Caesar who forced the partnership upon Pompey,64 on 
ttbe otber hand, it was due to Pompey' a support that Caesar had riaG to such a 
54 See above 25-~6 and n. 35. 
55 See above 26-27 and nn. 37, 39 and 40. 
56 See above 65 and n. 54. 
57 See above 67 and n. 63. 
;8 See above 27 and n. 42. 
;9 Se. above ~7 and n. 41. 
to See above 30 and n. 55. 
61. See above 27 and n. 43. 
62 See above 27 and n. 44. 
63 See above 27 and n. 47. 
64 See above 35-36 and nn. tf1 and 70. 
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position of power to make the triumvirate possible.6, Among the other authors 
there is little agreement as to the authorship of the pact. Caesar's66 state-
ments, naturally enough, seem to lay the blame upon Pompey, wbile the asser-
tion of feUeius Paterculus67 that such was Caesar's intent implies that it 
was Caesar himself who was the master-mind of the assooiation. Suetonius68 
apparently agrees with 'eUeius, but Seneoa69 is oategorioal in charging 
!pompey with the full onus of the conspiraoy; F10rus70 is non-oom.m1tta1~ Ne ... er-
theles., whether or not Pompey was the chief plotter, his participation in the 
triumvirate is at best a serious ref1eotion, according to Cicero,71 on his 
political judpent. 
After the meeting of Pompey and Crassus with Caesar at Lucca, in 
which the association of the three was renewed and strengthened, Pompey secured 
the consulship again, along with Crassus, for the year 55. The administration 
pi this second consulship met with little approval at the time72 and was later 
se ... erely censured,73 for it was then that Caesar' 8 proconsular com.mand was 
65 See abo ... e 33-34 and nn. 63 and 64. 
66 Se. abo ... e 65 and nn. ;6 and 57. 
67 See aboTe 67 and n. 65. 
68 See aboye f:J:.J-70 and nn. 74 and 75. 
(;fJ See abo ... e 68 and n. 70. 
70 See abon 70 and n. 76. 
71 See aboye 35-36 and nn. (;fJ and 70. 
72- See aboye 67 and n. 67. 
73 See aboTe 64 and n. 51. 
extended and he was placed in the position that was to enable him to force his 
will upon the Roman people or plunge the nation into civil war' Pompey seems 
to have been little more than a pam clearing the way for Cs,eear's adv.;>.D.ce. 
Tl~ee years later Pompey was consul for the third timeJ he bad now broken with 
Gaesar and his independent action shows him in a more favorable light! at 
~east, he is given credit for such cohstructive acts of government as the 
curbing ot election abuses74 and the reformation ot legal procedure in the 
oourta.7S The following two years witnessed a rapid march of events, as the 
term of Caesarts command drew to a close, his enemies were eagerly waiting to 
crush hiro. as a private citizen, while he himself was determined to circumvent 
them by stepping immediately from his cOJDlllalld into the consulship. In the con-
~equent poll tical maneuverilli, Pompey seems to have been torn between a real 
anxiety for the welfare of the republic, a desire to be fair to Caesar and a 
rear for his om threatened supremacy. The inoonsistencies into which such a 
\State of mind led him are reflected particularly in the letters of Cicero and 
paelias Rufus: Pompey is an exam.plary citizen well able to cope with the 
dangerous situation,76 he is sincere and will keep the peaoe,?? he doesn1t 
.. ant peace,78 he makes statesmanl1..k:e pl'onouncements on the risks of a hollow 
74 See above 67 and n. 68. 
7S See above (;;f:J and n. 72. 
76 See above 31 and nne S7 and S8. 
77 See above 32 and n. 59. 










peace,?9 he wants to be a king and reign after the manner of Bulla,SO he is 
the worst of statesmen,Sl he is a Qissembler,8~ he inspirea confidenoe.S) And 
he croms his apparent vacillation with his unashamed equivocation in the 
matter of Caesar's standing for the consulship ia Ab§ent1a.8.4 Ci'YU war 
follows, and Pompey's star rushes to its eclipse. 
Such is the pioture of fompey as a statesman. It is, on the whole, 
a dismal one, although it has its splashes of brilliance. yet, the available 
evidenoe hardly warrants the wholesale oondemnation of Pompey as a hopeless 
incompetent. On a number of' occasions he showed himselt capable ot Yigorous 
and judiciQUS action, even though in the broad general polie,r of government he 
ultimately proved a failure. That a heavily oontributing cause of that failure 
may have been something outside himself baa already been pointed out in Chap-
ter III,85 Caesar was the bfte QQ.r! ot Pompey's career, Caesar was the sting 
that quickened into lite that fund8mental weamess of Pompey's character which 
vitiated so muoh of his political activity. The majority of his more salutary 
acts of government were free from the influence or irritanoe of Caesar and 
would thua seem to indicate that, when acting independently, Pompey was not 
79 See above 32 and n. 61. 
80 See above 34-35 and nn. 65-67. 
81 See above 35 and n. 68. 
8~ See above 6,3 and n. .48. 
83 See above 63 and n. 49. 
84 See above 64 and n. 51. 65-66 and n. 59J 71 and n. 79. 
85 See above 72. 
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oompletely lacking in statesmanlike qualities. That he had those qualities, 
~owever, of which truly great statesmen and patriots are made is not apparent 
from the evidence at hand. 
In regard to the third aspeot under which Pompey is being studied in 
ithis thesi5, namely, his character and personality as an individual, a corre-
~ation of the opinions of Cicero, as ~resented in Chapter II, with those of 
the other writers of Chapter III, is, from the very nature of those opinions 
~d the manner in which they have been presented, unnecessary and, in a certain 
~ense, impossible. The two groups of opinions have been summed up in their 
respective chapters and the content and point of view of each group are so 
~isparate that aI1. attempt to interweave them into a composite whole would add 
~othing to the general picture. Cicero's treatment is entirely subjective' his 
~ortrai t of Pompey's character and personal! ty is prinCipally a history of the 
progress of the supposed friendship between the two - and it reveals more of 
Cicero than of Pompey. But it is appa.rent, as has already been pointed out in 
vhe concluding portion of Chapter 11,86 that, in spite of Pompey's many faults 
~d, in particular, his seeming treaohery in the Clodian &ffair, there must 
1Sve been in him a certain outstanding nobility of character and attractive-
p.ess of personality to be able to win and hold the friendship of a man of such 
~ sensitive nature as Cicero. In the writers of Chapter III, who are more 
:>bJective in their judgments, the emphaSis falls in two ohief directionSI on 
the one i~d, there is the general praise of Pompeyts whole character that is 
86 See above 44. 
101 
summed up in the passages cited from Yelleius Paterculus87 and Lucan;88 espe-
dally in his private life was he an exemplary ci ti.en - honest and upright, 
generoue, modest and unpretentious in his mode of life, temperate and 
restrained in his desires and, according to the moral standards of the times, 
remar~bly continent. These encomia, which none of the other authors sees fit 
to contradict, at least as far as his private life is concerned, confirm to 
some extent the inference that bas been drawn from Cicero of Pompey's inherent 
nobility of character. It is only in his public career that there appears that 
serious detect which overshadows his finer qualities and seems to transform 
Pompey into the unscrupulous adventurer which too many writers, both ancient 
and modern, have found him to be. That defect, which is the second point of 
emphasis of the wrl tars in Chapter III, is the sJ.m.oat insane jealousy which 
sprang from his overweenini ambition for power. Caesar,89 VeUeius,90 Sene-
ca, 91 Lucan~ and Florus9' have all pointed out that Pompey oould not endure 
to see anyone equal in authority with himself. On this dominant fault, the 
present writer believes, oan be laid the blame for all the inconsistencies of 
Pompey's character and personality that bave been noted. By his mad paSSion 
$7 See above 7'-76 and n. 9~. 
88 See above S0-81 and n. 106. 
69 See above 74 and n. 87. 
90 See above 75-76 and n. 9~, and 76-77 and n. 9'. 
91 See above 77 and n. 97. 
9~ See above 80 and n. 10'. 
93 See above 81 and n. 108. 
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for power and glory, a. man naturally honest and fair-minded, generous and 
loyal, honorable and sincere, was driven into attitudes and actions that 
gained for him the oontrary reputation of treachery, selfishness and deceit. 
It is llttle wonder that the study of Pompey's character still, after so many 
centuries, affords grounds for the greatest divergence of opinion. 
Such is the portrait of Pompey as a soldier, a statesman and a man 
that has been bequeathed to posterity by his conteaporanee and by others who 
were near to him. in time and space. Of the three &spects, it is in his quality 
of general that he appears to the greatest advantage} and it is to this, prin-
cipally, that he owes his still-li'fing tame • .As a man, he was no worse, and 
~robably a great deal better, than the maJori~ ot the public figures of the 
late republic and the early empire. His political career is the least pleasing 
aspect ot his lite} abUi ty he undoubtedly had, but it was so nullified by the 
errors and excesses into which his prevailing weakness led him that in the sum 
total his attempts at statesmanship proved a failure. To one who was eager to 
be the first man of the state, the savior and guardian of the republlc, that 
failure must have seemed the failure of his Whole life, and Pompey would prob-
ably be the first to acquiesce in the judgment of Lucan. 
Stat JIl8.jD.i nominis umbra. 94 
The mere shadow of a miihty nUle he stands. 
94 Lucan i.l,3;. 
BellU!! 01 yi.1.,. 
Brutus_ 
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